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SECTION I: INTRODUCTION  
A key message at the 2007 Red Cross and Red Crescent International 
Conference was that “one of the greatest challenges facing humanity is 
environmental degradation, including deforestation, desertification, pollution, and 
climate change…”
1
 Environmental degradation leads to more vulnerable societies 
with less access to resources. Less access to resources is one of the factors that fuels 
international conflict.
2
 Furthermore, climate change will most likely lead to an 
increase of intensity and frequency of weather extremes. This includes floods, heat 
waves, droughts, and hurricanes.
3
  Extreme weather can lead to an increase in 
diseases like malaria and can affect other factors like mass migration, poverty, and 
social inequality.
4
 The current status of environmental protection is not sufficient 
enough to stop these accelerated changes from happening. Thus, more must be done 
by the leading international institutions to ensure that the environment is protected 
and that sustainable development is an effective and achievable goal. 
As we move from a sovereignty-ruled system to a more globalized world, the 
growing influences of international financial and trade organizations such as the 
World Trade Organization (hereinafter “WTO”), the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (hereinafter “IMF”) are becoming more significant.
5
 
As these institutions increase in power, their relationships with sustainable 
development have become more strained. In the past half-century, trade barriers 
have greatly been reduced, and international trade has increased rapidly.
6
 Through 
the WTO, a global rules-based trading system has emerged. While still a relatively 
new organization, the legitimacy of the WTO is illustrated by the fact that most 
                                                 
1 
See generally International Committee of the Red Cross, Key Messages and Facts on Environmental 
Degradation, Resource Centre, available at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/30-
international-conference-key-messages-environmental-degradation-201107.htm [Accessed last: 30 
November 2011]. 
2
 See generally Alex Evans, Resource Scarcity, Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict, 
World Development Report 2011: Back Ground Paper (2010) 1-23. 
3 
See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Working Group 
II: Impacts, Adaption and Vulnerability, available at: 




 See generally The Bretton Woods Committee, About the Bretton Woods Committee, available at 
http://www.brettonwoods.org/index.php/167/About_the_Bretton_Woods_Committee [Accessed last: 
1 January 2012]. 
6 
G. Sampson, The WTO and Sustainable Development, TERI Press, first published by United 
















countries in the world are members and that the recommendations and case 
outcomes of the Dispute Settlement Body (hereinafter “DSB”)
7
 are generally strictly 
followed. With the growing increase in world trade, there has also been an increase 
in awareness and desire to achieve sustainable development. Often policies on these 
two areas have overlapped, and as the current Director-General of the WTO, Pascal 
Lamy, has stated, “these days, however, the WTO cannot simply ignore the need to 
promote and preserve the environment.”
8
 
There are many definitions of “sustainable development,” but the most 
frequently used one comes from Our Common Future, also known as the 
Brundtland Report.
9
 It states:  
"Sustainable development is development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs. It contains 
within it two key concepts:                                    
- the concept of needs, in particular the essential needs 
of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should 
be given; and 
- the idea of limitations imposed by the state of 
technology and social organizations on the 




The Brundtland Report also defines sustainable development as “a process of 
change in which the use of resources, the directions of investments, the orientation 
of technological developments, and institutional change all enhance the potential to 
meet human needs both today and tomorrow.”
11
 
This vague and broad definition relies on the notion that the world’s 
environment is a system where actions in one country can affect life on other 
                                                 
7
 See World Trade Organization, DSU, Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 2, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 354 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 




 United Nations, Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common 




















continents. Examples of this include the 2010 Icelandic volcano eruption that 
affected air quality and travel in Europe, and the recent radiation detected in the 
United States after the earthquake and subsequent radiation leaks in Japan. The 
definition also implies that practically every aspect of our lives can have some 
effect, or can be relevant to, achieving a sustainable development goal. Most forms 
of production and consumption, key aspects of international trade, affect and can 
harm the environment. Thus, the issue is less about stopping these actions and more 
about making them less harmful to the environment and humankind.  
There will always be tension between forms of economic activity and 
environmental protection. However, trade is only one of many economic activities, 
and the WTO cannot be solely responsible for all aspects of the promotion of 
sustainable development and environmental protection. At its most general 
definition, international trade is the “economic interaction among different nations 
involving the exchange of goods and services.”
12
 It can lead to both economic 
growth and development. At its core, international trade involves the basic concept 
of supply and demand. Human needs and desires drive what will be in demand. This 
demand drives the need for a supply of that resource. Thus, the real question is what 
aspects of the current trading system, including the WTO, can be enhanced or 
changed to promote sustainable development.  
This paper aims to examine the relationship between the WTO and 
sustainable development. It further seeks to evaluate the ways in which the 
relationship has been successful and the ways in which it has been hindered. Finally, 
this paper looks to the future and suggests ways to enhance and change this 
relationship and more effectively protect the environment through the WTO.  
 This paper is divided into six major parts. Section I contains the introduction. 
In Section II, the history of the protection of environmental rights and the promotion 
of sustainable development in both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(hereinafter “GATT”)
13
 and the WTO are examined. This is done by looking at 
applicable legislation, declarations, and conferences. The third section analyses 
                                                 
12 
Economic Glossary, Economic Definition of International Trade, available at: 
http://glossary.econguru.com/economic-term/international+trade [Accessed last 30 November 2011]. 
13

















relevant GATT and WTO case precedent. The fourth section deals with the current, 
on-going, and persistent debates that must be addressed before any serious progress 
can be achieved. In Section V, recommendations are discussed. In the conclusion, a 
summary of the findings is given.   
SECTION II: THE GATT AND THE WTO ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTIONS AND THE PROMOTION OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 
As the WTO is the international body designated to administer trade rules 
and act as the major trade negotiating forum, it follows that the discussion of the 
relationship between trade and sustainable development should start there. By first 
analysing past and current WTO protections and by investigating relevant WTO 
case law, it can be shown that a history already exists of at least attempting to 
protect environmental rights and promote sustainable development in the 
international economic arena. However, while there is evidence of the attempts to 
bring these two areas together, the results are mixed, and the cases are not always 
successful.  
When looking at the history of the relationship between trade and the 
environment, it is also relevant to look at applicable United Nations (hereinafter 
“UN”) declarations and treaties. The WTO is a specialized agency of the UN, but it 
has very little power in governance terms. The two organizations maintain a close 
relationship that is governed by the “Arrangements for Effective Cooperation with 
other Intergovernmental Organizations-Relations between the WTO and the United 
Nations,”
14
 which was signed in 1995. The WTO Director-General also participates 
on the Chief Executive Board (hereinafter “CEB”), the organ of coordination within 
the UN system that brings together the heads of various bodies, including the 
Bretton Woods institutions, with the purpose of promoting coherence within the UN.  
The GATT text, the precursor to the WTO, was negotiated in 1947 and came 
into force on 1 January 1948.
15
 In 1994, the text of the GATT was revised, and 
                                                 
14
 World Trade Organization, The WTO and the United Nations, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/wto_un_e.htm [Accessed last 15 November 2011].  
15
















during the Uruguay Round in 1995,
16
 the GATT was incorporated into the newly 
formed WTO as a legal text binding all member states.
17
 The GATT does not 
contain any specific provisions that solely deal with the environment. Likewise, the 
WTO does not have any explicit agreements that exclusively cover the issue. 
However, the WTO has taken several initiatives to protect environmental rights and 
promote sustainable development. These protections have evolved over time and 
have become more inclusive. Major criticisms about these protections centre on the 
fact that there are still no actual commitments to protect with fear of enforcement or 
repercussion. Rather, they only talk of how members should offer forms of 
protection. 
II. A. The GATT: Pre-WTO Environmental Protection 
When the GATT was first written, sustainable development was not a major 
issue, and the GATT itself does not explicitly mention the environment. At its 
inception, the main purpose of the GATT was to create a forum where a large 
number of member states would have the responsibility of “administering the 
complex web of legal rules, political relationships, and economic policy instruments 
that govern world trade.”
18,19
 The main obligation of the GATT was the tariff 
concession which is a commitment of a member state to impose no more of a tariff 
on imports than it would on other member states. This commitment is echoed in 
Article II of the GATT, where nations agree not to impose a “custom duty on a 
particular product in excess of the level listed on its tariff schedule.”
20
 Countries are 
bound to the prices on their schedule, and if a product does not appear on it, then the 
nation may set any price it likes. The GATT, however, provides an explicit 
                                                 
16 
World Trade Organization, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 2 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 14, 33 I.L.M. 
1143 (1994). 
17
 WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 
1994, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL 
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 4 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994). 
18
 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Free International Trade and Protection of the Environment: 
Irreconcilable Conflict? Pg. 700 In Fairness to Future Generations: International law, Common 
Patrimony, and Intergenerational equality (1989) 704-705. 
19
 Robert E. Hudec, The Legal Status of the GATT in the Domestic Law of the United States, in The 
European Community and GATT 187 (Meinhard Hilf, Francis G. Jacobs & Ernst Ulrich Petersmann 
eds., 1986). 
20
















framework for renegotiating tariff schedules. Thus, the purpose of the GATT was to 
set regulations on tariffs and not protect the environment.  
 Many countries began passing environmental protections in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. In the United States, the National Environmental Policy Act
21
 was 
enacted in 1969. By some counts there are over nine hundred national and 
international legal instruments solely devoted to environmental issues,
22
 but there 
still remains no general international agreement on environmental protection like 
there is on trade. By looking at first steps of GATT, one can see the evolution of the 
attempts to merge the international trade and environmental protection fields. 
II. A .i. GATT First Steps 
In 1971, the GATT Council of Representatives set up the Group on 
Environmental Measures and International Trade (hereinafter “EMIT”) that was 
open to all members but would only convene at the request of GATT members.
23
 
This has only happened once, when it was it requested by the European Free Trade 
Agreement members (hereinafter “EFTA”) who asked the GATT to contribute 
research and support to the upcoming 1992 UN Conference on Environment and 
Development (hereinafter “Rio Conference”).
24
 The effects of this report and the Rio 
Conference will be discussed in greater detail in Section II. A. ii. of this paper.  
The link between the environment and trade was officially recognized in 
1972 at the UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm.
25
 A 
study prepared by the Secretariat of GATT, entitled “Industrial Pollution Control 
and International Trade,”
26
 focused on the implications of environmental protection 
                                                 
21
 National Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1969), 42 U.S.C. SS4321-
4347 (1988). 
22
 Edith Brown Weiss, Environment and Trade Partners in Sustainable Development: A commentary 
The American Journal of Environmental Law Vol 86: no. 4. (Oct 1992) 728-735, 729. 
23
 See generally World Trade Organization, EMIT-GATT Group on Environmental Measures and 
International Trade, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/hist1_e.htm [Accessed 
last 31 December 2011]. 
24
 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development, UN Docs. 2 April 1009 E/CN.17/1997/8 (1992). 
25
 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, The History of Sustainable Development 
in the United Nations, available at: http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/index.php?menu=22 [Accessed 
last: 31 October 2011]. 
26 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Industrial Pollution Control and International Trade, 
















policies on trade and discussed “green protectionism.” One result of this conference 
was the Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment that laid out 
26 principles concerning environmental protection.
27
 The UN Conference on the 
Human Environment was also seen as the first time that both developed and 
developing nations came together to discuss and “delineate the ‘rights’ of the human 
family to a healthy and productive environment.”
28
 After the UN Conference 
concluded, more meetings were held to discuss further issues in-depth, such as “the 
rights of people to adequate food, to sound housing, to safer water, [and] to access to 
means of family planning...”
29
 
The 1980s also ushered in some expansive declarations of environmental 
protections. The World Conservation Strategy (hereinafter “WCS”) was published in 
1980 by the International Union for the Conservation of Natural Resources.
30
 This 
strategy is known to be one of the precursors to the current concept of sustainable 
development,
31
 and it emphasized that environmental conservation cannot be 
achieved without development that also alleviates people in poverty.
32
 It also 
stressed that the future of humanity was at risk unless the fertility and productivity 
of Earth was safeguarded.
33
 
In 1982, the 48
th
 plenary of the UN General Assembly approved the World 
Charter for Nature,
34
 which stated, “mankind is a part of nature and life depends on 
the uninterrupted functioning of natural systems.”
35
 In 1983, the World Commission 
on Environment and Development (hereinafter “WCED”) was created. In 1984, 
WCED became an independent body of the UN General Assembly, and it was 
charged with formulating a “global agenda for change.”
36
 The result of this was the 
aforementioned Brundtland Report,
37
 published in 1987. This report advanced the 
                                                 
27
 United Nations, Industrial Pollution Control and International Trade, UN Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 
1(1973); 11 ILM 1416 (1972). 
28
















 ANPED Northern Alliance for Sustainability, Our Common Future: The Brundtland Report, 
available at: http://anped.org/index.php?part=176 [Accessed last: 1 January 2012]. 
37
















awareness of the relationship between global interdependence, the economy, and the 
environment.  It also declared that, “the environment does not exist as a sphere 
separate from human actions, ambitions and needs, and therefore should not be 
considered in isolation from human concerns. The environment is where we all live; 
and development is what we all do in attempting to improve out lot within this 
abode. The two are inseparable.”
38
 Thus, there was a growing awareness that 
environmental issues were growing in importance in the international sphere.  
II. A. ii. 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development 
The 1992 Conference on Environment and Development, also known as both 
the Rio Conference and the Earth Summit, drew attention to the role of international 
trade in poverty alleviation and in combating environmental degradation. The event 
was hosted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
Secretariat (hereinafter “UNCED”). The major result of the Conference was the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development.
39
 Other agreements were reached 
during this time, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity
40
 and the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (hereinafter “UNFCCC”).
41
 The 
Conference signified a shift in international agreement on the importance of the 
environment, and it was the first time the UNCED legitimized their participation in 
sustainable development issues.  
Principle 8 of the Rio Declaration signified one of the first times that 
humankinds’ lifestyle was tied to sustainable development publically by an 
international governance organization.
42
 It called for an urgent and needed change in 
consumption habits and production patterns. This principle was widely 
acknowledged at the time by world leaders,
43
 but not much was done to actually 
hold them accountable to their word. Also developed during the Rio Conference was 
Agenda 21: A Program of Action for Sustainable Development (hereinafter “Agenda 




Supra, n. 24.  
40
 United Nations Environment Program, Convention on Biological Diversity, 11 January 2005 
UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/3/INF/4 (2005). 
41
 United Nations, Framework Convention on Climate Change, June 4, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1994).  
42
 Supra, n. 24 at Principle 8. 
43


















, an action plan that addressed the importance of promoting sustainable 
development, even through international trade.
45
 It recognized each member states’ 
right to pursue economic and social progress while also giving them the 
responsibility to adopt models of sustainability. Agenda 21 also reaffirmed that 
sustainable development was deeply rooted in and connected to the integration of 
three pillars of society: economic, social and environmental.
46
 
The Rio Conference was seen as both a success and a failure on different 
issues. As for its successes, the Conference introduced an array of new non-state 
actors that wished to be included in the sustainable development discussion, 
including the WTO.
47
 The Rio Conference signified the first time that Non-
governmental Organizations (hereinafter “NGOs”) were officially allowed to 
participate in the discussions because they were given access to working drafts and 
documents, the ability to circulate their own drafts, the ability to address meetings, 
and they were prominent in delegations of many developing countries.
48
 This 
progression showed that a large number of business organizations were interested in 
at least discussing environmental issues, and it “demonstrat[ed] worldwide corporate 




The Rio Conference was seen as a failure in that it did not significantly 
bridge the growing gap between developed and developing nations, and it did not 
concretely solidify the concept of sustainable development. A large amount of the 
criticism on the Rio Conference comes from developing nations and focuses on 
Agenda 21. In 1993, to combat these criticisms, the UNCED created the 
Commission on Sustainable Development (hereinafter “CSD”) as a follow-up to 
                                                 
44
 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21: Programme of Action 
for Sustainable Development, available at: 






 Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future, Institute for 
International Economics (1994) at 26. 
48
 Sylvia Ostry, The WTO After Seattle: Something’s happening here, what it is ain’t exactly clear 
Preliminary draft, University of Toronto (2001) 1-32, 9-10, available at 






















 The successes and failures of the Rio Conference can be summed up in 
Principle 12 of the Declaration, which reads: 
States should cooperate to promote a supportive and 
open international economic system that would lead to 
economic growth and sustainable development in all 
countries, to better address the problems of 
environmental degradation. Trade policy measures for 
environmental purposes should not constitute a means 
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on international trade. Unilateral 
actions to deal with environmental challenges outside 
the jurisdiction of the importing country should be 
avoided. Environmental measures addressing 
transboundary or global environmental problems 




Sustainable development is recognized as a goal of all member states. 
However, that goal should clearly not come at the cost of interfering with the 
jurisdiction of other states. Thus, in 1992, the UN was ready to recognize some 
sustainable development goals as they related to trade, but it was not willing to 
discuss matters that were trans-jurisdictional. The World Summit on Sustainable 
Development, held in Johannesburg in 2002, renewed a global commitment to 







                                                 
50
 See generally The United Nations, About the UN Commission on Sustainable Development, 
Division of Sustainable Development, available at: http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/csd/csd_aboucsd.shtml 
[Accessed last 31 December 2011]. 
51
 Supra, n. 24 at Principle 12.  
52
 United Nations Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 
available at: 
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/WSSD_PlanImpl.pdf [Accessed 
















II. B. The WTO  
The WTO has two functions: legislative and judicial,
53
 the latter of which is 
discussed in greater detail in Section III. The legislative function of the WTO is to 
act as a forum where member states reach trade agreements.
54
 Thus, it acts less as a 
legislature that passes laws and more like a forum where a ‘co-operative’ of 
members meets to discuss and negotiate. For the purposes of this paper, the term 
“WTO” is often used synonymously with “WTO member states” and the “WTO 
Secretariat.”  Like the GATT, there is no one unequivocal agreement in the WTO 
framework that deals specifically with protecting the environment or promoting 
sustainable development. However, the WTO’s commitment to both is clearly 
stated. On its website, the WTO declares: 
Sustainable development and protection and 
preservation of the environment are fundamental goals 
of the WTO. They are enshrined in the Marrakesh 
Agreement, which established the WTO, and 
complement the WTO’s objective to reduce trade 
barriers and eliminate discriminatory treatment in 
international trade relations. While there is no specific 
agreement dealing with the environment, under WTO 
rules members can adopt trade-related measures aimed 
at protecting the environment provided a number of 
conditions to avoid the misuse of such measures for 
protectionist ends are fulfilled. 
The WTO contributes to protection and preservation 
of the environment through its objective of trade 
openness, through its rules and enforcement 
mechanism, through work in different WTO bodies, 
and through ongoing efforts under the Doha 
Development Agenda. The Doha Agenda includes 
specific negotiations on trade and environment and 




Thus, it would appear that the WTO is at least willing and able to declare its 
commitment to both environmental protection and the promotion of sustainable 
development. However, again like the GATT, these promises are merely declaratory 
                                                 
53




 World Trade Organization, Trade and Environment, available at: 
















and hold no concrete obligations or fear of ramifications. In fact, many of the 
criticisms of the WTO are the same ones that also plague the actual concept of 
international law itself. Mainly, that it is irrelevant and illusory, that powerful states 
ignore it when advancing their own goals, that it does not come from one central 
authority, and that it is generally not backed by sanctions.
56
 
 However, the WTO has done a good job of trying to establish itself in the 
international law realm of trade. The WTO has a large number of complying 
members that generally follow the rules, and it adopts binding judicial judgements 
that could trigger sanctions if not adhered to.
57
 While the WTO does not specifically 
use the term “sanctions,” its judicial powers are allowed to authorize the withdrawal 
of trade sanctions.
58
 Proof of the WTO’s growing influence is illustrated by the fact 
that all states have responded to WTO judgements by modifying their domestic 
practices, laws, and regulations.
59
 In the few cases where domestic politics have 
blocked WTO compliant modifications, actual sanctions have resulted.
60
 This 
illustrates that the WTO members are willing to make binding judgments that may 
affect member states negatively. 
II. B. i. WTO Founding Charter  
The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, often called the “WTO 
Agreement” or the “Marrakesh Agreement,” was signed in Morocco in 1994 and 
was entered into force on 1 January 2005. It incorporated the text of the previous 
GATT and maintained the goal of trade liberalization based on three core principles, 
some of which have been discussed above: 
 
 
                                                 
56
 Gregory C. Shaffer, Defending Interests: Public-Private Partnerships in WTO Litigation, The 
Brookings Institution (2003) at 1. 
57






 See EC – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas WTO Document Series 
WT/DS27/R May, 22, 1997); and EC – Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products WTO 
















(a) most-favoured nation -- Article 1 states that any 
privilege granted to one member must be granted 
to other member states; 
(b) national treatment -- Article III requires that 
foreign goods imported into a member state be 
treated in the same manner as goods produced 
domestically in that state; and 
(c) prohibition on import/export restrictions – Article 
XI prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports or 
exports, such as a ban on imports from a particular 
country or a measure that has had the effect of 




These three core principles are the main source of contention in WTO 
litigation, especially concerning environmental rights and sustainable development. 
For the first time, the Marrakesh agreement also included a DSB
62
 that would act as 
a legally binding judicial authority.
63
 The DSB hears cases brought to it by member 
states against other member states concerning violations of GATT text, the 
Marrakesh agreement, and the supplemental documents. It is here that most of the 
progress on sustainable development issues and environmental protections have 
been debated or discussed, and case precedent has been set. The relevant cases and 
the holdings of the DSB are discussed in Section III of this paper.  
Some additional modifications were made to the original GATT text, and the 
new GATT is often referred to as GATT 1994.
64
 For the purposes of this paper, the 
major changes in the GATT 1994 are not relevant, so the “GATT” designation refers 
to both forms of the document. The new GATT also included supplemental 
documents on issues concerning trade in services,
65
 trade-related aspects of 
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 technical barriers to trade,
67
 and sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures.
68
 These Agreements were important steps in the objective of sustainable 
development. For example, th Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(hereinafter “TBT Agreement”) recognizes the protection of the environment and 
sustainable development as legitimate objectives
69
 and the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights recognizes an environmental 
exception in regard to patents.
70
 All of the supplemental documents, the Marrakesh 
Agreement, and the original GATT text are indivisible, and any member state that 
ratifies one of the agreements is also agreeing to be party to all of them. 
The WTO also took another first step by explicitly declaring in the preamble 
of the Marrakesh agreement that sustainable development is a major objective of the 
organization.
71
 This has been seen by some as a declaration that the WTO 
understands “the need for environmentally responsible free trade.”
72
 The Marrakesh 
Agreement also created the Committee on Trade and Environment (hereinafter 
“CTE”) to “contribute to identifying and understanding the relationship between 
trade and environment in order to promote sustainable development.”
73
 The results 
of the CTE have so far been minor, with its most major accomplishment being that it 
is now recognized as a symbol of institutionalizing environmental standards in the 
WTO.
74
 However, these new steps are both declarations of an understanding and 
differ significantly from actual action. As the WTO is still a relatively new 
organization, it will take time to see if this objective will be met or even made a 
significant priority. 
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II. B. ii. Current Status 
The WTO is currently in the Doha Round of negotiations. In 1991, The Doha 
Ministerial Declaration (hereinafter “Doha Declaration”)
75
 launched the current 
discussions and strongly reaffirmed the WTO commitment to sustainable 
development. Paragraph 51 of the Declaration called on the WTO’s Committee on 
Trade and Development (hereinafter “CTD”) and on the CTE to “identify and debate 
developmental and environmental aspects of the negotiations, in order to help 
achieve the objective of having sustainable development appropriately reflected.”
76
 
As a result of this, the CTE has made sustainable development a standing item on its 
agenda and has participated in numerous environmental and developmental debates 
in the Doha Round.  
The WTO Secretariat and its committees have also published a number of 
background papers that have made significant contributions in defining the 
relationship between trade and the environment.
77
 These papers are often written by 
the WTO Trade and Environment Division and are eventually made public.
78
 One of 
the most well-known of these reports was written in 1999 by the WTO Secretariat 
titled the “Report on Trade and the Environment.”
79
 This report is widely cited and 
continues to be a major force in the trade-related environmental field,
80
 despite its 
weaknesses including failing to recommend any modifications “to enhance a 
positive interaction between trade and environmental measures...”
81
 
In 2005, the WTO Secretariat organized a Symposium on Trade and 
Sustainable Development to help fulfil the obligations of Paragraph 51 of the Doha 
Declaration.
82
 The focus of the Symposium was the relevance of the sustainable 
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development concept to the Doha work program, the contribution of trade towards 
sustainable development, and capacity programs to promote sustainable 
development.
83
 Once again, besides declarations of commitment to the issue and 
discussions of what the concept meant in the trade world, little action was planned 
or promised. Thus, despite the intent of the Symposium, little progress has been 
made to implement Paragraph 51. This suggests that there is serious resistance to 
any sort of comprehensive approach to structured timelines and targets aimed at 
bridging the gap between trade and the environment.
84
 
The reviews of the successes of the Doha Round are mixed, but it is clear 
that all of the goals of the Doha Declaration will not be met at its conclusion.
85
 As of 
December 2011, the talks to end the Round were deadlocked, mostly over the 
discussion of a free trade pact and the failure to bridge the differences between 
developed countries, developing countries, and least-developed countries 
(hereinafter “LDCs”), opinions on lowering industrial tariffs, and cutting farm 
subsidies.
86
 If the Doha Round fails to come to a decisive conclusion, then the 
legitimacy of the WTO as a whole will probably be questioned, and it is more than 
likely that they will lose some public support. The matter is somewhat dire, as seen 
in Pascal Lamy’s urgent statement t  members that, “the lack of convergence that 
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SECTION III: WTO CASE PRECEDENT
88
 
Under the GATT, six Panel proceedings involving an examination of 
environmental measures and human health-related measures were heard. Of the six 
reports, three were adopted. Since 1995, three proceedings have been completed and 
adopted by the WTO’s DSB. The six GAT/WTO Panel rulings that were adopted are 
discussed below. The unadopted Panel decisions are not discussed in this paper, with 
the exception of the Tuna Dolphin
89
 case. This case is discussed below for its 
relevance and continued use as precedent in international law and because it was the 
first time the importance of sustainable development was recognized in a 
GATT/WTO Panel decision. Also, it illustrates the noticeable evolution of the 
interpretation of Article XX of the GATT.
90
 
It should also be noted that much of what countries have done to promote 
free trade or protect the environment have not raised legal issues. This is not to say 
that legal issues were not involved; rather, it says that no member state wanted to 
make a legal issue out of an environmental protection measure. Except for one case, 
all of the adopted Panel proceedings involve exceptions under Article XX of the 
GATT 1994 which, in relevant parts, states:  
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not 
applied in a manner which would constitute a means 
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in 
the Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of 
measures: 
(a) necessary to protect public morals; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life 
health; 
(c) relating to the importation of exportation of silver or 
gold; 
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(d) necessary to secure compliance with the laws or 
regulations which are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this agreement...; 
(e) relating to products of prison labour; 
(f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of 
artistic, historic or archaeological value; 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources if such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production 
or consumption; 
(h) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any 
intergovernmental commodity agreement...; 
(i) involving restrictions on exports of domestic material 
necessary to ensure essential quantities of such 
materials to a domestic processing industry during 
periods when the domestic price of such materials is 
held below the world price as part of a governmental 
stabilization plan...; 
(j) essential to the acquisition or distribution of products 
in general or in local short supply....
91
   
While the majority of environmental claims involve subparagraphs (b) or (g), most 
of the text of Article XX is included above for illustrative purposes and to show 
other subparagraphs which could possibly be used in complaints in the future. For 
example, member states could attempt to use subparagraph (a) to establish an 
exception that goes against the very morals of the country. A member state could 
also attempt to claim an exception under subparagraph (h) for a historic parcel of 
land. This author does not claim that any of these complaints would be successful; 
rather, the WTO DSB is a relatively new body, and all of the exceptions under 
Article XX have yet to be tested as they relate to the environment and the objective 
of sustainable development.  
When a case is brought before the DSB, the burden of proof is on the party 
that is invoking the exceptions, generally under Article XX, to validate a GATT 
inconsistent measure.
92
 A traditional analysis of all of the exceptions under Article 
XX would make this a difficult burden to meet, as the GATT Panel has itself held 
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that the Article should be interpreted narrowly and that none of the exceptions 
explicitly create an obligation in themselves.
93
 This means that the Panel will not 
analyze an aspect of Article XX unless it is invoked by one of the parties in the 
dispute. There are other Articles that are sometimes claimed as an exception, but for 
the purposes of this paper they are not discussed in detail as they very rarely relate to 
environmental claims. 
III. A. United States — Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from 
Canada 
The Panel finding was adopted pre-WTO on 22 February 1982.
94
 “An import 
prohibition was introduced by the United States after Canada seized 19 fishing 
vessels and arrested US fishermen for fishing albacore tuna without authorization 
from the Canadian government in waters considered by Canada to be under its 
jurisdiction. The US did not recognize this jurisdiction and introduced an import 
prohibition to retaliate under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act,
95
 
which prohibited the entry of all tuna products from Canada. 
First, the Panel found that the import prohibition was contrary to Article 
XI:1
96
 of the GATT. Then, it looked to see if it was justified under either Article 
XI:2 or under Article XX (g) of the General Agreement.
97
 It found that it was not. 
As for Article XX (g), the Panel did find that the tuna was “an exhaustible natural 
resource”; however, the article did not apply as the “United States had not imposed 
identical or similar restrictions on domestic tuna consumption or production.”
98
 
Thus, the Panel found that the United States was in violation of the GATT as its 
measure constituted an impermissible quantitative restriction on trade that was not 
applied equally on like domestic and foreign products.  
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III. B. Canada — Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and 
Salmon (“Herring and Salmon”) 
The Panel finding on the Herring and Salmon case was adopted pre-WTO on 
22 March 1988.
99
 Under the 1976 Canadian Fisheries Act, Canada maintained 
regulations prohibiting the exportation or sale for export of certain unprocessed 
herring, sockeye salmon, and pink salmon. The US complained that these measures 
were inconsistent with GATT Article XI and that no exceptions applied.
100
 Canada 
argued that these export restrictions were part of a system of fishery resource 




In examining Canada’s Article XX (g) exception claim, the Panel started 
with an analysis of the actual language of subsection (g). The Panel held that the 
salmon and herring in question were “exhaustible natural resources.” However, it 
also held that the Canadian law was not “related to” the conservation of the fish, and 
it was not “in conjunction with” restrictions on domestic consumption or 
production.
102
 By doing so, the Panel declared that “relating to” means that the 
measure is “primarily aimed at the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource 
[emphasis added].”
103
 They also held that “in conjunction with” means that the 




In this case, the Panel found that Canada had failed to prove that its 
regulations on export restrictions had been primarily aimed at rendering effective a 
domestic restriction or conserving the herring and salmon. The Panel did not 
examine Canada’s exception claims under the chapeau of Article XX, as it had 
already held that the measures were not an exception of subparagraph (g). The Panel 
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also found that Canada had failed to place similar limits on domestic consumption of 
the fish, a ruling similar to the previous case between the two countries.
105
 
In summary, the Panel found that the measures maintained by Canada were 
contrary to GATT Article XI:1 and were not justified by Article XI:2 (b) or by 
Article XX (g). The Panel also clarified the definition and plain meaning of some of 
the words in Article XX (g) and made the distinction that it is not necessary to 
examine the claim under the chapeau of Article XX if the section in question is 
already found to not apply. This case was also important because it granted states 
the right to argue an exception to the GATT under Article XX “in the alternative.”
106
 
This means that a state can claim innocence, but if found to be in violation, then it is 
“in the alternative” allowed to violate the article in question under an exception.  
III. C. Thailand — Restrictions on the Importation of and Internal Taxes on 
Cigarettes (“Thailand Cigarettes”) 
The Panel finding on Thailand-Cigarettes was adopted pre-WTO on 7 
November 1990.
107
 The United States brought suit against Thailand claiming that 
Thailand’s laws prohibiting the importation of cigarettes while subsequently 
authorizing the domestic sale of them, was a inconsistent with Thailand’s duties 
under Article XI:I and was not excused under Article XX.
108
 Furthermore, the 
United States claimed that Thailand’s actions were meant to protect the domestic 
cigarette market rather than the health of its citizens.
109
 The regulation in question 
prohibited importation of cigarettes unless the Director-General granted a license.
110
 
At the time of the case, the Director-General had not granted such a license in over 
ten years. Furthermore, the United States claimed that Thailand had launched a 
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In response, Thailand claimed that its restrictions were justified under Article 
XX (b) to protect the health of its citizens.
112
 Thailand also claimed that the 
cigarettes imported from the United States contained additives and chemicals that 
were not found in the domestically made cigarettes and that the restriction was the 
only way that the government could make sure that its citizens’ health was 
protected.
113
 Interestingly, the United States did not counter with a discussion about 
the health risks of cigarettes. Instead it argued that Thailand should seek to reduce 
its number of smokers in ways that are more consistent with GATT and that any 
exceptions under Article XX should be taken on a national treatment basis.
114
 Also, 
the United States argued that Thailand did not have similar domestic safeguards, and 
the domestic sale of cigarettes remained on a high level.
115
 
In examining these claims, the Panel adopted the “least-GATT-inconsistent” 
test, which was explained as such:  
Import restrictions imposed by Thailand could 
be considered to be “necessary” in terms of Article 
XX (b) only if there were no alternative measures 
consistent with the General Agreement, or less 
inconsistent with it, which Thailand could reasonably 




Here, the Panel held that Thailand could have used other measures to protect the 
health of its citizens and thus had failed the “least-GATT-inconsistent” test.
117
 The 
Panel went even further to suggest ways in which Thailand could have done this, 
including using a strict, non-discriminatory labelling and ingredient disclosure 
regulation
118
 or a ban on both domestic and foreign cigarette advertising.
119
 
In summary, the Panel found that the import restrictions were inconsistent 
with Article XI:1 and not justified under Article X1:2 (c). It further concluded that 
the import restrictions were not “necessary” within the meaning of Article XX (b). 
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The internal taxes were found to be consistent with Article III:2. Also important to 
note in deciding what was “necessary,” the Panel did not give any consideration to 
the subject matter. Thus, tobacco was probably treated in the exact same manner that 
other products would have been treated, i.e., as a product that is not inherently 
dangerous to those who use it. The Panel chose again to not discuss the case under 
the merits of the chapeau of Article XX. The Panel did find, though, that Thailand 
could maintain certain advertising restrictions on smoking, as long as the restrictions 
were applied the same to domestic and foreign cigarettes.
120
 Thus, today, Thailand 
has one of the strongest anti-smoking campaigns, and imported cigarettes only 
account for 3% of the market.
121
 
III. D. i. United States — Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from 
Mexico (“Tuna I” or “Tuna Dolphin”) 
This Panel decision was not adopted. Mexico brought action against the 
United States claiming that it was violating its obligations under GATT Articles XI 
and XIII and was not covered by the exceptions under Article XX (b) and (g).
122
 The 
regulation under scrutiny was the United States’ Marine Mammal Protection Act of 
1972 (hereinafter “MMPA”),
123
 which prohibited the importation of tuna or tuna 
products into the United States that had been harvested by purse-seine nets in the 
Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (hereinafter “ETP”). The United States claimed that 
the prohibition was necessary because schools of dolphins often swam above 
schools of tuna, and the use of purse-seine nets to catch the tuna were also 
inadvertently catching and killing dolphins.
124
 Some proof was also given that 
fisherman were actually locating schools of dolphins and fishing there, with the 
hopes of also catching tuna.
125
 
The United States further argued that the MMPA did not violate the GATT 
because its regulations on domestic fisherman were similar to those that were 
imposed on foreign fisherman. Thus, national treatment under GATT Article III:4, 
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permitted its actions, and quantitative restrictions under Article XI did not apply.
126
 
The Panel dismissed the national treatment argument as irrelevant
127
 as Article III 
only applied to products and that countries could not ban imports of products made 
by processes that were harmful to the environment or to living resources. Thus, the 
Panel made a distinction between product and process. From the sustainable 
development prospective, the product in this case was yellow-fin tuna, and it is as 
equally important as the process used to attain the product – the dolphins killed 
while fishing. The Panel decision took away countries’ ability to ban products solely 
on the basis of environmentally unsuitable practices.  
The United States also argued that the MMPA was justified under the 
exceptions listed in Article XX (b) because: “(1) dolphins are a threatened species, 
(2) there is credible evidence that yellow fin tuna and dolphins can be found in the 
same waters, (3) catching tuna does result in incidental killing of dolphins, and (4) 
prohibiting the use of purse-seine nets can minimize the incidental killing of 
dolphins.”
128
 The Panel struck down this argument by stating that the United States 
had failed to prove that it had fulfilled the primary step in invoking an Article XX 
exception, mainly that it had not “exhausted all options reasonably available to it to 
pursue its dolphin protection measures...”
129
 In summary, the Panel held that to meet 
the burden of Article XX (b), the member state must “(1) adopt the least-GATT-
inconsistent measure; (2) prove that it has exhausted all options before adoption of 
the measure; and (3) apply it in a manner that is least-GATT-inconsistent, meaning 
that the treatment of domestic and foreign parties must be identical.”
130
 
Under Article XX (g), the United States claimed that dolphins were an 
“exhaustible natural resource” and that the MMPA was “in conjunction with” 
restrictions on domestic consumption and production of yellow fin tuna.
131
 The 
Panel again ruled that the United States had failed to meet this test in that it had not 
meet the “primarily aimed at” requirement because the regulations were based on 
United States statistics and rates and therefore could not apply to Mexican 
                                                 
126
 Id.  
127
 Id at para 5.11-5.15.  
128
 Id. at para. 3.33. 
129
 Id. para. 5.33.  
130
 Supra, n. 92 at 1148.  
131
















fisherman. This means that the Panel believed that the United States actions were 
more based on gaining an advantage over the Mexican fisherman rather than on 
protecting the dolphins. Unlike its interpretation of Article XX (b), the Panel did not 
set a clear guideline of what a party must do to meet the burden of proof and have 
the exception apply. The Tuna Dolphin report also affirmed that countries could 
limit the import of products that were harmful to the domestic environment of the 




III. D. ii. United States — Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products 
from Mexico (“Tuna II”) 
 Like its predecessor, this Panel decision was also not adopted. In this case, 
the MMPA was again at issue. This time, countries that were affected under the 
“intermediary nation embargo” filed the complaint, most notably the Netherlands 
and the European Economic Community (hereinafter “EEC”). The MMP had two 
distinct categories of embargo, the primary nation embargo and the intermediary 
nation embargo.
133
 Under the primary national embargo, imports of tuna or tuna 
products into the United States were prohibited if they were harvested by a method 
that resulted in the incidental killing or serious injury of marine mammals.
134
 Under 
the intermediary nation embargo, nations that both import tuna and tuna products 
and export them to the United States “must certify and provide reasonable proof that 
it has not imported products subject to the direct prohibition within the proceeding 
six months,” and any nation that failed to certify as such was not allowed to export 
the products into the United States.
135
 The purpose of this regulation was to ensure 
that tuna and tuna products imported into the United States from intermediary 




 The Netherlands and the EEC claimed that none of the exceptions in Article 
XX applied, while the United States claimed exception under subparagraphs (b), (d), 
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and (g). As for subparagraph (b), the Panel found that it did not apply because it was 
not necessary because it forced other countries to “change their policies within their 
own jurisdictions, and it required such changes to be effective.”
137
 Under 
subparagraph (d), the Panel limited its scope to only cover laws and regulations that 
are in themselves justified, meaning that because the “primary embargo” focused on 
in Tuna I was found to not apply under Article XX, then the intermediary law based 
on the primary embargo could itself not apply individually under subparagraph (d).  
 Under subparagraph (g), the Panel again sided against the United States but 
did offer a more comprehensive explanation as to why it ruled this way. This was 
not something that was done in Tuna I. Here, the Panel gave a three-step analysis for 
subparagraph (g).
138
 The first step was to ask whether or not the intermediary nation 
embargo provisions were part of a policy to conserve an exhaustible natural 
resource. Secondly, the Panel asked whether or not the intermediary embargo 
provisions were made “in conjunction with” domestic consumption and production 
and “related to” conservation efforts. Finally, the Panel asked whether or not the 
intermediary actions were applied in a manner that was arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions occur.
139
   
 Using the above analysis, the Panel found that the MMPA intermediary 
nation embargo only satisfied the first step but failed to satisfy the second. This 
meant that the Panel agreed that dolphins were an exhaustible natural resources but 
that the protection of the dolphins under the MMPA was not “in conjunction with” 
or “related to” the United States’ conservation efforts. The Panel further concluded 
that the United States’ measures were meant to force other countries to comply with 
its standards, and this, in and of itself, went against the basic core of the nature of 
the GATT. Simply put, the Panel was stating that it would not condone actions that 
forced member states to change their laws, even if the objective of those laws was to 
protect living things. 
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 For the purposes of this paper, it should also be noted that this was the first 
decision that expressly stated and recognized the importance of sustainable 
development and protection of the environment: 
The Panel noted that the objective of sustainable 
development, which includes the protection and 
preservation of the environment, has been widely 
recognized by the contracting parties to the General 
Agreement. The Panel observed that the issue in this 
dispute was not the validity of the environmental 
objectives of the United States to protect and conserve 
dolphins. The issue was whether, in the pursuit of its 
environmental objectives, the United States could 
impose trade embargos to secure changes in the 




Thus, the Panel was showing a noted shift in thought that there was a dual objective 
of the trading system, free trade and sustainable development, which included 
environmental protection and conservation.
141
 
III. E.  United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline 
(“Reformulated Gasoline”)  
The Panel finding on Reformulated Gasoline was adopted on 20 May 1996, 
and this was the first case adopted after the WTO was established.
142
 The case 
brought by Venezuela and Brazil against the United States claimed that the laws and 
regulations implemented by the United States in its Clean Air Act of 1990 
(hereinafter “CAA”)
143
 violated the United States’ obligations under the GATT and 
was not excusable under any exception. A simplified description of the claims by 
Venezuela and Brazil included unfairness in the regulations set by the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (hereinafter “EPA”) gasoline rule that set 
different baseline establishment methods for domestic refiners and foreign importers 
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and refiners. The EPA claimed that its intention for setting these regulations was to 
conform with the CAA.
144
   
Venezuela and Brazil claimed that the EPA regulations discriminated against 
other countries because it did not allow them to use individual baselines, and it 
limited the methods by which domestic importers could calculate their own 
baselines.
145
 In response, the United States argued that its regulations did not violate 
the GATT, but if it did, in the alternative it fell under exceptions listed in Article XX 
(b), (d) and (g).
146
 
In examining Venezuela and Brazil’s claim, the Panel first held that the 
EPA’s rule was inconsistent with the GATT.
147
 Next, it analyzed the rule 
individually under the three exceptions claimed by the United States in the 
alternative. Under subparagraph (b) the Panel held that the United States regulation 
did not pass the “least-GATT-inconsistent” test, as it treated foreign refineries less 
favourably than domestic ones in a way that was not “necessary” to obtain the 
objectives of the EPA and CAA.
148
 Under subparagraph (d) the Panel held the same 
as it did in the Tuna Dolphin case, that measures cannot be invoked under this 
section as it is an exception for measures necessary to secure compliance with laws 




Finally, the Panel held that the EPA’s rule was not an exception under 
subparagraph (g) because the regulations that applied to importers of foreign 
gasoline was not “related to” or “primarily aimed at” the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources.
150
 The Panel did declare that clean air was an exhaustible natural 
resource but that there was “no direct connection between less favourable treatment 
of imported gasoline that was chemically identical to domestic gasoline and the 
objective of improving air quality in the United States...”
151
 Thus, even though an 
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exhaustible natural resource existed in this case, the connection between that 
resource and intention of the law did not.  
In summary, the Panel affirmed that the United States had every right to 
adopt the highest possible standard to protect its air quality so long as it did not 
discriminate against foreign imports. Here, the United States lost the case because it 
discriminated between the domestic and foreign markets because its regulations on 
domestic producers were less stringent than those imposed on imported gasoline. 
This case was appealed, and the Appellate Body’s decision varied 
significantly from the original holding concerning Article XX (g). The scope of the 
appeal was limited to this one section, as it was the only point the United States 
disputed. The Appellate Body applied a two-tier analysis to subparagraph (g). First, 
it analyzed the EPA’s rule under the requirements of (g), and then it examined the 
rule under the chapeau of Article XX.
152
 The Appellate Body affirmed the decision 
of the Panel in that the EPA’s rule was inconsistent with the GATT. However, the 
Appellate Body differed from the Panel in that it found the EPA’s rule to fall under 
the exception of Article XX(g) because it was “primarily aimed at” the conservation 
of natural resources for the purposes of Article XX(g).
153
 By declaring this, the 
Appellate Body was held that “primarily aimed at” should not be interpreted as 
meaning “related to” or “in conjunction with.” This holding was a departure of the 
tradition of the Panel to interpret Article XX (g) narrowly. The Appellate Body as 
held that Article XX(g) requires a level of “even handedness” and not “identity in 
treatment” as long as domestic restrictions have some form of equivalent restrictions 
that meet the “in conjunction with” test.
154
  
Finding that the EPA rule did meet the exception under Article XX (g), the 
Appellate Body then turned to examine the chapeau of Article XX. Here, the 
Appellate body examined the rule independently of its analysis under subparagraph 
(g), meaning that to be declared an exception under Article XX, the measure must 
not only be an exception under one of the subparagraphs, it must also meet be 
declared an exception independently under the chapeau or Article XX. It also 
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expanded the scope of the chapeau by declaring that the Vienna Convention
155
 
required that each subparagraph under Article XX impose different burdens and that 
each should be interpreted differently based on the specific facts of each case.
156
 
Thus, the chapeau should in and of itself be interpreted in the light and purpose of 
the whole agreement and on a case-by-case basis.
157
  
The Appellate Body ultimately came to the same conclusion as the Panel and 
found that the United States’ regulation was inconsistent with the GATT and did not 
fall under an exception of Article XX.
158
 It differed from the Panel, though, in that it 
found the United States did not meet the exceptions test based on the chapeau of 
Article XX.  Here, the Appellate Body found that administrative burden of the 
EPA’s regulation was not so great as to justify discriminatory and stricter treatment 
of foreign refiners. While it did come to the same final conclusion, the Appellate 
Body did reverse the Panel’s Article XX (g) analysis. In doing so, the Appellate 
Body allowed for cases to be heard on a case-by-case basis by using a different 
standard than had been used before. In summary, the Appellate Body recognized “its 
duty to balance Article XX interests with the trade liberalization goals of the GATT 
in each case that comes before it.”
159
 
III. F. European Communities — Measures affecting asbestos and asbestos-
containing products 
The Panel finding was adopted on 5 April 2001.
160
 Canada brought a 
complaint against France that challenged a French decree that banned the 
importation of all asbestos or asbestos containing products.
161
 The decree did allow 
for a limited exception for some asbestos-containing products containing chrysotile 
asbestos because there were no alternatives for that product at the time that posed a 
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 Canada alleged violations of France’s national treatment 
obligation,
163
 the prohibition on quantitative restrictions
164
 and of the TBT 
Agreement.
165
 France responded by claiming that the embargo was justified by 
“scientific evidence that exposure to asbestos can cause serious illness, including 
lung cancer [and] mesothelioma...”
166
 
First, the Panel discussed whether or not asbestos, asbestos-containing 
products, and the available alternatives to asbestos were “like products” under 
Article III:4 of the GATT.
167
 The Panel used a “likeness test” that turned on four 
factors: “the properties, nature, and qualities of the products; end uses of the 
products; consumers’ perceptions and behaviour; and the tariff classification of the 
products.”
168
 Using this test, the Panel found that they were like products, and thus 
an examination under the exceptions was necessary.
169
 Next, the Panel found that 
the French measure was justified under the chapeau of Article XX and under 
subparagraph (b), as it was “necessary to protect human ... life or health.”
170
 Thus, 
the Panel opened the door for member states to make successful environmental 
exception claims under this subparagraph.  
Canada appealed the ruling, and the European Communities, on behalf of 
France, cross-appealed concerning the likeness designation in the Panel report. The 
Appellate Body reaffirmed the decision of the Panel but modified the reasoning 
concerning the “like products” designation under Article III:4. According to the 
Appellate Body, asbestos alternatives are not like products to asbestos or asbestos-
containing products.
171
 The Appellate Body affirmed that the Panel had used the 
correct four factor “likeness test”; however, it had not applied the test correctly as it 
had failed to examine all the evidence in context, including the distinct physical 
properties of the products.
172
 Here, the toxic nature of asbestos and asbestos-
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containing products differs from the non-toxic nature of the alternatives, which is 
relevant to consumer preferences.
173
 Thus, Canada had failed to meet the burden of 
the “likeness” designation for the purposes of the complaint and an examination of 
exceptions was not necessary. Regardless, the Appellate Body also upheld that the 
measure would have been justified under Article XX (b) anyway.
174
 
In summary, the Panel and the Appellate Body in this case both rejected 
Canada's challenge to France’s import ban on asbestos and asbestos-containing 
products, reinforcing the view that the WTO Agreements support members' ability 
to protect human health and safety at the level of protection they deem appropriate. 
This is the only adopted Panel case concerning the environment where an exception 
under Article XX was one of the major determining factors in the final decision. 
III. G. United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products (“Shrimp-Turtle Case”) 
The Panel finding was adopted on 21 November 2001.
175
 The case was 
brought by India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand against the United States 
concerning Section 609 of the Endangered Species Act and its implementing 
regulations, guidelines, and judicial rulings (hereinafter “Section 609”).
176
 Section 
609 prohibited the importation into the United States of certain types of shrimp and 
shrimp products that were harvested using a type of commercial fishing technology 
that could also adversely affect certain types of endangered sea turtles.
177
  
The United States Secretary of State could exempt countries from this law by 
certification in two ways: first, certification was granted to countries with a “fishing 
environment that [did] not pose a threat to the incidental taking of sea turtles in the 
course of shrimp harvesting;”
178
 or second, certification was granted to those 
harvesting nations that “provided documentary evidence of the adoption of a 
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regulatory program...that is comparable to the United States.
179
 Thus, countries 
could only be exempt from the law if they already posed no danger to sea turtles or 
if they changed their regulations to match, or be comparable to, the laws of the 
United States. 
Further to the facts of the case, guidelines were drafted in 1991, 1993, and 
1996 pursuant to Section 609 that required fisherman from nations in the Caribbean 
and Western Atlantic region to use special Turtle Excluder Devices (hereinafter 
“TEDs”) that were comparable to those used by the United States to be considered 
for certification.
180
 It was alleged that these guidelines, and Section 609 itself, 
violated Articles XI:I and XIII:I of the GATT and that there were no justifiable 
exceptions under Article XX. The United States responded by saying that the 
regulations on foreign fisherman were the same ones that were applied domestically, 
and “in the alternative, Section 609 was justified under Article XX (b) and (g).”
181
 
The Panel found that Section 609 did violate Article XI:I and was not 
exempt under Article XX.
182
 In holding such, the Panel first examined the regulation 
under the chapeau of Article XX and found it to be out of the scope of the Article 
because it appeared that the United States had created it with the intention of 
adopting the measure  more for the purposes of threatening the multilateral trading 
system and less about saving the turtles.
183
 This analysis was based on the fact that 
the regulation forced others to adopt a similar measure to the United States’.
184
 
 On appeal, the Panel’s ultimate outcome was upheld, but the interpretation of 
Article XX was reversed. The Appellate Body found that Section 609 was within the 
scope of Article XX and that it met the qualifications under subparagraph (g) as sea 
turtles are “exhaustible natural resources.”
185
 It further held that the regulation was 
both “related to” and “in conjunction with” the conservation of the sea turtles.
186
 
However, the regulation failed to qualify for exception under the chapeau of the 
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Article. Here, the Appellate Body again made it clear that the analysis of Article XX 
includes two steps: first, the measure must be analyzed under the subparagraph, and 




The holding recognized that under WTO rules governments have every right 
to protect human, animal, or plant life and health and to take measures to conserve 
exhaustible resources. The WTO does not have to “allow” them this right. Initially, 
the United States lost the case because it applied its import measures in a 
discriminatory manner; it then revised its measures to introduce flexibilities in 
favour of developing countries.
188
 Thus, the Appellate Body subsequently concluded 
that the US ban was consistent with WTO rules.  
This case was also significant for two other factors. First, the ruling stated 
that WTO Panels may accept “amicus briefs,” also know as friends of the court 
submissions, from Non-governmental Organizations (hereinafter “NGOs”) or other 
interested parties.
189
 Second, in its decision, the Appellate Body relied heavily on 
the language of the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement citing the objective of 
sustainable development.
190
 This gave the language of the preamble legal 
significance and advanced the goal of stricter environmental protections. 
SECTION IV: PERSISTANT DEBATES 
Before any real change can be made within the WTO to more effectively 
protect the environment, the current persistent debates over the issue must be 
addressed. This includes the ongoing debate between the environmentalists and the 
free trade advocates and the intense debate between developing and developed 
nations over the role of the WTO in protecting the environment. These debates not 
only cover whether the WTO should protect the environment, but they also discuss 
how far protection should go and whether state sovereignty should trump 
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protections. Finally, the question of what role the WTO should play in more 
effectively protecting the environment and promoting sustainable development must 
be addressed. As one scholar noted, “unfortunately, trade and environment policy 
encompasses not a single issue, but a multiplicity of related (and unrelated) concerns 
that have been bundled under the ‘trade and environment’ rubric,”
191
 meaning that 
there is no one issue that must be fixed or one organization that can fix everything. 
The issue is large and complicated. It is self-evident though, that the WTO must play 
some role in more effectively protecting the environment and achieving its goal of 
sustainable development. 
IV. A. Environmentalists vs. free trade advocates 
At first glance, it would appear that the goals of environmental rights and 
free trade are mutually exclusive, and many debates have occurred between 
environmentalists and free trade advocates concerning the protection of the 
environment and the promotion of sustainable development. Anti-globalization 
supporters have traditionally had a large voice in this debate. However, it would 
appear that the argument is slowly shifting away from those discussions and that the 
anti-globalization movement is being absorbed by a larger conversation on just what 
the WTO should protect. In simpler terms, it is clear that we live in a globalized 
world. Many environmentalists are catching onto this point and are now framing 
their questions within the globalized frame, rather than working outside of it. Now 
the questions and debates are beginning to focus on what the WTO can and should 
do concerning the protection of the environment. 
One of the main points of contention between the two sides focuses on trade 
restrictions. Schoenbaum has attempted to sum up the many different types of trade 
restrictions that the majority of the environmentalists vs. free trade debates centre 
on. He claims that there are four main environmental restrictions: 1) regulations 
adopted by all nations to safeguard their domestic resources and environment; 2) 
international agreements on trade restrictions; 3) states with stringent environmental 
controls questioning the adequacy of protections in other nations; and 4) controls on 
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 This list is not exhaustive, and covering both (or all) sides of 
the debate on each issue is beyond the scope of this paper. For the purposes of this 
discussion, the list above illustrates that the environmental trade-related discussion 
encompasses many aspects, and it is not a simple debate of good vs. evil. Below, the 
designation “environmentalists” may be a bit of a misnomer and stereotype, but it is 
meant to represent those who are hesitant to fully accept free trade and those who 
tirelessly advocate for environmental rights. This author also recognizes that many 
people and organizations may fall into both categories of “environmentalists” and 
“free trade advocates.” 
IV. A. i. The Environmentalists 
Environmentalists generally tend to focus on how trade liberalization will 
hurt the environment. Their main arguments include that liberalization will “invite 
increased pollution, lost regulatory sovereignty, an anti-environmental counterforce 
driven by desire for jobs and profits, and policy making by obscure, unaccountable, 
business-oriented international bureaucrats.”
193
 They also argue that international 
trade promotes the exploitation of natural resources, with some even claiming that 
“free trade can destroy the environment.”
194
 While some environmentalists try to 
work within the current system, others have attempted to vilify the WTO and free 
trade and have made them the constant prey of their attacks. Of course, this does not 
mean that free trade advocates are victims in this debate; rather, it suggests that in 
the past, the majority of environmentalists have preferred to work against, rather 
than with, the current system.   
One main point that environmentalists use to illustrate how the WTO is 
inconsistent with environmental protection is to look at the outcomes of the DSB 
cases. More specifically, they generally cite the Tuna Dolphin case as a clear 
example of how free trade can exploit and destroy the environment.
195
 However, this 
conclusion would be misguided at best because in that case the United States lost not 
because it wanted to protect dolphins but because it attempted to impose a unilateral 
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domestic standard on importing countries by using market access restrictions.
196
 
This is the exact sort of measure that the GATT was created to protect member 
states from.  
Environmentalists also claim that trade expansion can lead to rapid economic 
growth that can outpace the institutional structures and political will necessary to 
effectively address resulting environmental impacts.
197
 Trade expansion can distort 
growth, moving countries toward unsustainable production patterns. Furthermore, 
trade-dependent economies also split the consumers of products geographically, 
culturally, and economically from those who bear the environmental and social costs 
of production, thus undermining the ability to build political will for curtailing 
unsound consumption.
198
 Finally, both domestic and international environmental-
protection policies may be weakened if they are found to interfere with trade-
expansion policies, particularly given the predominant position of trade-expansion 
policies in the international system. 
Some argue that promoting free trade inevitably leads to Gersham’s Law,
199
 
where “a competitiveness toward less stringent environmental regulation and 
protection, and that industries will migrate to areas with lower environmental 
standards.”
200
 This means that allowing for some member states to have less strict 
regulations could create a haven where other member states, with higher regulations, 
go to produce products. Even if these businesses do not move the whole of their 
companies to new jurisdictions, they could outsource labour to countries with these 
lower standards. 
Many environmentalists have noted the stark difference in international 
environmental standards. This has lead to some to call for the “[WTO] to sponsor a 
new negotiation of an environmental code setting forth minimum standards for 
certain key economic sectors and that violations of that code then be treated as 
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subsidies subject to a countervailing duty.”
201
 This lofty goal would be hard to 
achieve. First, it has been difficult to get large numbers of countries to agree on 
environmental protections. This is probably the main reason that it has yet to be 
done. Simply stating that it should be done does not illustrate how it can be done. 
Furthermore, even if countries were able to reach an agreement, there is a big 
difference between a country agreeing to the protections and a country enforcing the 
protections.  
Finally, there has also been a notable divide between environmentalists and 
developing nations and LDCs. Environmentalists again claim that these countries 
have unreliable and ineffective methods for dealing with environmental degradation 
and that many of their current procedures do more harm than good.
202
 This is a 
misguided opinion, though, as this is an area where environmentalists could actually 
make a large difference in the future. For example, if they were to promote different 
forms of production in developing countries that are more cost effective, both the 
environment and trade would benefit. To put it another way, “environmentalists 
should not advocate withdrawing from the trade-environment debate, but instead 




IV. A. ii. Free Trade Advocates 
On the other side of the debate are free trade advocates. Some stanchly 
believe that trade has no impact on the degradation of the environment as evidenced 
by statements such as, “if trade were responsible for environmental degradation, 
then presumably those countries that trade the least, such as Ethiopia and Sudan, 
would have the best environments. We know that this is not the case...”
204
 and “trade 
creates wealth, and wealth cleans up the environment.”
205
 The first of the two quotes 
lacks validity because the fact that Ethiopia, Sudan and South-Sudan are not at the 
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forefront of environmental friendliness, and sustainable development is not solely 
related to the fact that they are not powerhouse, world-wide traders. Rather, it is 
probably more based on distribution of resources, political unrest, and a number of 
other factors. The second quote is probably a better representation of the free trade 
advocate mindset.  
Some free trade advocates also argue that trade-fuelled economic growth is a 
worthwhile objective regardless of environmental issues or resulting degradation.
206
 
Alternatively, they sometimes argue that growth is a necessary prerequisite for 
developing countries to begin addressing environmental protection.
207
 This means 
that a country that is still in the development stages lacks the ability to fruitfully 
protect the environment too. This is misguided, though, because even if a 
developing country lacks the resources to fully integrate environmental standards, 
this does not mean that it should not try its best to implement as many standards as it 
is able. Promoting sustainable development in the developing stages could also 
cause technological advances. Implementing sustainability measures at the very 
beginning stages of development has rarely been done, and it is unknown what kind 
of scientific breakthroughs might occur.
208
 For example, building sustainably viable 
fisheries in developing countries would probably result in advances in efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness.
209




Furthermore, there is a fear among free trade advocates that stricter 
environmental restrictions could limit developing countries’ access to global 
markets and be used as a veiled form of protectionism. For example, environmental 
protection regulations could be used to block foreign producers from entering 
domestic markets, not to protect the environment but rather to promote internal 
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 Thus, supporting the use of trade penalties to enforce 
environmental agreements or to “promote unilaterally determined environmental 
choices”
212
 could lead to the degradation of the whole trading system. 
Free trade advocates also fear that any efforts to adjust and create different 
environmental standards and compliance costs to address competitiveness concerns 
could undo the differences in comparative advantage that form the foundation of the 
economic gains in trade.
213
 However, they fail to take into account that even if there 
is a unilateral environmental standard, there will still be many other factors affecting 
world-trade. For example, the costs for an oil-rich country would be less to produce 
oil than for a country that has minimal oil reserves. Also, if a county has specialized 
in garment making, then its costs to make garments will be less than those without 
that same expertise. Trade will always still be at the mercy of things like distribution 
of natural resources, geography, weather, and access to technology.   
Finally, free trade advocates argue that all countries have the sovereign right 
to exploit their own natural resources. It follows then, that the manner used to 
exploit these resources is completely up to the sovereign state, whether it be 
environmentally sustainable or not. However, this right to sovereignty has been 
increasingly challenged as evidenced by Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration 
on Human Environment of 1972 and the Rio Conference. One thing is certain, 
though: the environment and sustainable development are increasingly recognized as 
global concerns.
214
 Thus, free trade advocates have little choice to support some 
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IV. B. Developed Countries vs. Developing Countries and Least-developed 
Nations 
There is a long history of arguments between developed countries, 
developing countries, and LDCs over who wants environmental protections, what 
level of protections there should be, and who should ultimately be responsible for 
those protections. In this debate, developed nations are sometimes called the North, 
while developing nations are called the South. For the purposes of this paper, both 
the developed and developing nation terms are used synonymously with North and 
South designations. The WTO recognized the importance of integrating developing 
nations and LDCs into the international trade community while also preserving the 
environment and promoting sustainable development.
215
 This was done by 
recognizing sustainable development as a main objective that should be achieved by 




Initially, the lines between the North and South were clearer, and it was 
evident that “unilateral actions by developed nations overstepped the boundaries of 
domestic regulations and invaded national sovereignty.”
217
 This was done by 
restricting developing nations’ market access using environmental justifications.
218
 
However, this line between the two worlds is no longer as clear. Developing nations 
are quickly catching up in technological advances to their neighbours in more 
developed areas. Also, some Southern members are forming coalitions that rival the 
power held by i dividual countries in the North. Now unilateral environmentally 
friendly measures promoted by the North could even be the cause of 
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The traditional cooperative relationship that should exist between the 
environmentalists in the North and developing nations in the South is strained in the 
environmental protection realm.
220
 Developing nations do not want to divert limited 
resources to environmental protections, and developed nations refuse, or are unable, 
to subsidize or assist the South. Instead of solely giving aid, the North has also relied 
on negative leverage trade measures to enforce environmental policies.
221
 As 
mentioned above, the majority of the debates have focused on what levels of 
protections are needed and who is ultimately responsible for these protections. 
Recurring themes also include the use of power plays concerning who is in charge 
and whose needs and desires are ultimately fulfilled, and if environmental protection 
interferes with sovereignty. 
Concerning the developed nations, there has been a major push for more 
unilateral environmental protections and the promotion of sustainable development, 
even if it comes at a high cost. Concerning the developing nations and LDCs, there 
is the belief that the processes and laws are wholly unfair to them because they 
create a loss of sovereignty and that the standards set are almost impossible to meet. 
The South has begun to retaliate by forming powerful coalitions that need to be 
taken seriously by those in the North.   
IV. B. i. Developed Countries 
 With the recent push for more environmental protection and further 
promotion of sustainable development, it is common sense to state that achieving 
both of these objectives is easier for rich and more developed nations. In turn, it is 
these same countries, like those in Europe and the United States, that push the most 
for environmental regulations and bring the most claims before the WTO’s DSB.
222
 
While the reasoning for this is mixed and ranges from actually caring and wanting to 
better protect the environment for future generations to a veiled form of trade 
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 the intent of actually doing something to protect the environment is 
clear.  
 The influence of developed countries in the WTO can be seen concerning 
environmental rights and sustainable development by looking at the types of cases 
that have been heard by the DSB. Mostly, these cases have focused on: the legality 
of measures that have extraterritorial effects like those for endangered species and 
air quality; domestic health, safety and environmental protection; transboundary 
remediation; and trade-environment institutions.
224
 Thus, the DSB has proven to be 
an effective way for developed nations to exercise their power.  
Furthermore, it has been shown that “when powerful countries engage in 
integration-depending exercise, they require enhanced trade-environment solutions 
as part of the package they bring home for domestic ratification.”
225
 This means that 
many of the WTO regulations require not only international negotiation and 
bargaining but also the needed integration of domestic regulations. This necessary 
step of domestic integration has been easy for the North to comply with but has 
proven difficult for the South.
226
 Reasons for this include lack of political stability 
and lack of monetary, technological, and information resources in developing 
nations and LDCs. Developed nations have expectations for the South to keep up 
with them, or at least catch up at some point in the foreseeable future. 
 Finally, another reason that so much pressure for increased environmental 
protection may be simply because many of the large-scale international 
environmental groups are based in developed nations.
227
 Thus, these governments 
face larger scale lobbying efforts to make changes both domestically and 
internationally.
228
 They also face wide-ranging pressure to comply with international 
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regulations with fear or negative media and declining public opinions.
229
 For 
instance, if the United States failed to comply with an environmental regulation, it 
would be more publically chastised than Morocco would be for violating the same 
regulation. Granted, the actual influence and amount of trading done by these two 
countries differs greatly, with the US accounting for a much larger share of world 
trade.
230
 Regardless, these two countries would face very different reactions to their 
violations of an environmental violation on the world stage. Simply put, developed 
nations are expected to do and be more. 
IV. B. ii. Developing countries and Least-developed Countries 
During this debate, developing countries and LDCs generally claim that 
promoting sustainable development and protecting the environment through WTO 
law and regulations is wholly unfair to them. They claim that following these 
regulations creates a loss of sovereignty, treats the nations in the South unfairly, and 
that the standards that are set are almost impossible to meet when playing 
technological catch-up with many of the nations in the North. Finally, there is a fear 
that “green” oriented motives in the North are actually being used as veiled trade 
restricting that amount to little more than eco-bullying.
231
 
It is important to remember that any state joining an international 
organization like the WTO is surrendering some sort of sovereignty. By acceding to 
membership in the WTO, countries promise to follow all of the regulations and rules 
created by that body. Thus, even if a country feels pressured into voting a certain 
way, it is still bound by the decision of the majority. Environmental trade-related 
regulations can deeply influence the sovereignty of a state as most things that are 
produced and consumed interact in some way with the environment.  
 In 2000, the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(hereinafter “ICESCR”) released a draft report titled: The Realization of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Globalization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of 
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 The report claimed that, inter alia, the WTO excluded developing 
countries from the decision making process.
233
 This report was swiftly rejected by 
the Secretariat of the WTO, but the damage had been done, and developing 
countries and anti-globalization advocates saw the report as a validation of their 
claims.
234
 Some of the reasons cited for this exclusion included pressure into voting 
the way developed nations were voting due to funding, being left out of “green 




 One major way that the South is combating this perceived unfairness is to 
form and utilize voting coalitions that are hesitant to approve of any environmentally 
friendly regulations during WTO sessions.
236
 Developing nations account for more 
than seventy-five percent of membership in the WTO,
237
 and they have only recently 
begun to realize the power that this statistic has. For example, one of the most well-
known developing country blocs is BRIC, which comprises of Brazil, Russia, India 
and China.
238
 This bloc has shown indications that it intends to work together on 
WTO related issues, including being cautious to accept strict environmental 
regulations.
239
 Another bloc is that of the G20, which brings together developing 
countries with traditionally different views on agriculture to negotiate on WTO 
issues.
240
 In fact, some of the current stalemate issues in the Doha Round are mostly 
due to the consulting blocs of developing nations refusing to be pressured into a vote 
                                                 
232
 United Nations, The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Globalization and its 
impact on the full enjoyment of human rights, UN Commission on Human Rights, 52d Sess., 
Provisional Agenda Item 4 Para. 15, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13 (2000) (Preliminary report 
submitted by J. Oloka-Ony-ango and Deepika Udagama). 
233
 Ala’i Padideh, A Human Rights Critique of the WTO: Some preliminary observations, 33 Geo. 
Wash. Intl’ Rev. 537 (2000-2001) at 537. 
234
 Supra, n. 48 at 16. 
235
 Mayur Patel, New Faces in the Green Room: Developing Country Coalitions and Decision-
Making in the WTO, GEG Working Paper Series 2007/WP33 (2007) 1-31, 4.  
236
 Sonia E Rolland, Developing Country Coalitions at the WTO: In Search of Legal Support 48 
Harv. Int’l L.J. 483 (2007) at 485.  
237
 Id. at 483. 
238
 See Generally Iulia Monica, Recent Trends of the Trade Policies of the BRIC Countries and 
Their Impact on the EU-BRIC Relationships, Institute of World Economy, Romanian Academy 
(2005). 
239
 Id.  
240
 Pedro da Motta Veiga, Brazil and the G-20Group of Developing Countries, Managing the 
Challenges of WTO Participation: Case Study 7, available at: 

















and the failure of developed countries to sway them.
241
 The North must learn to 
work with these increasingly powerful blocs if it wishes to maintain its influence. 
The argument also exists that countries in different stages of economic 
development cause different levels of harm. Sometimes called the “inverted U-
shaped curve,”
242
 the theory states that countries that are in the beginning stages of 
economic development cause more harm to the environment than those that would 
be classified as economically developed.
243
 Thus, the countries that are playing 
catch-up to more developed nations can cause serious damage to the environment. 
The current somewhat strict regulations and rules that allowed for the industrial 
revolution to take place, arguably one of the greatest pushes of trade-related 
advancements, did not exist at that time.
244
 If they did, it would have been hard or 
potentially impossible to meet current emissions and pollution standards or even 
labour or human rights regulations. More simply put, if the current environmental 
standards had been in place a few hundred years ago, the industrial revolution may 
never have taken place. This is, of course, not to say that all environmental 
regulation should be rejected in the South so that those nations can catch up to the 
North. Rather, it is an important fact that should be taken into consideration when 
setting standards for developed countries, developing countries and LDCs.  
IV. C. What role should the WTO have in protecting the environment and 
promoting sustainable development? 
Even though a main objective of the WTO is to promote sustainable 
development, it does not necessarily follow that another main objective of the WTO 
is also to take substantive measures to protect the environment. It would seem 
unlikely, however, that the WTO could maintain its current integrity if it only sought 
to promote free trade and neglected to account for other issues including the 
environment, human rights, and labour. As discussed above, some free trade 
advocates claim that the WTO is not the appropriate forum to discuss environmental 
measures. However, this claim is no longer valid. This is evident in the current Doha 
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Round where major environmental issues are being discussed, and the end of the 
round, if successful, will more than likely result in some significant environmental 
provisions.
245
 Thus, it is generally accepted that environmental rights and 
sustainable development are relevant concerns for the WTO.  
The two main alternatives to working within the current WTO system to 
protect the environment are to completely reform the organization or to create a 
new, world-wide international organization that would govern over all of the 
environmental protections and sustainability efforts.
246
 Both of these ideas are not 
viable alternatives. First, completely reforming the WTO would more than likely not 
pass consensus. Second, a new international organization would take years to form, 
ratify, and gain respect. Even if a treaty were drafted, it is not certain that a large 
number of states would sign or ratify it. If the organization got enough members, 
then it would take more time to build a reputation as a leader in the field. Any 
decision by this organization, whether judicially or legislatively, would most likely 
be non-binding. Furthermore, as it is impossible to completely separate trade and the 
environment, this new organization would make environmental decisions that would 
have an influence on trade. Finally, in all likelihood, by the time the any type of new 
organization was formed, the environment may have passed a point of no return 
where any type of sustainable development measures would be moot.  
 Rather than either changing the actual nature of the WTO or by creating a 
new international body to govern over environmental protections, it would be better 
to adjust the way the WTO approaches the issue. More simply put, it is no longer 
about whether or not the environment or sustainable development matter: they both 
clearly do. The issue should now focus on how the WTO, and trade-related rules, 
can more effectively contribute to environmental protection. By clearly defining 
what role the WTO should take in promoting sustainable development, the pressure 
to be a major leader in the field lessens, and the WTO can be used more as a vessel 
to exact some environmental protection. To support this, some scholars have come 
forward stating that defining clearer WTO sustainable development goals does not 
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necessarily require large-scale reforms.
247
 A relatively easy first step would be to 
create a non-binding resolution that clarifies the specific sustainable development 
objective of the WTO and gives some suggestions on how to achieve it. This should 
differ from its former declarations of support for sustainable development; rather, it 
should outline actual achievable actions that member states can start to take like 
suggesting pollution output goals or small-scale, low-cost sustainable development 
implementation strategies. Then, more long-term goals illustrated in Section V of 
this paper could be implemented over time.   
There are a few criticisms to this approach, mainly concerning who is in 
charge of the decision making at the WTO. Decision-making at the WTO is 
traditionally done by consensus; thus if one member state is against a measure, it 
will not pass.
248
 However, there are many claims of unfairness in this process in the 
sense that developing nations feel pressured into voting for what developed nations 
want. This issue is discussed in greater detail in Section IV. B., above. Before any 
progress could be made, any issues of imbalance would need to be discussed and 
addressed, including biases and unfair treatment. This would assist with the current 
stalemate that is going on the Doha Round.
249
 One way to accomplish this would be 
to increased transparency and encourage an actual, non-aggressive discussion 
between member states concerning this unfairness. Then, relationships with more 
trust would need to be built over time. 
Thus, the debate over whether or not the WTO should play a role in 
protecting the e vironment and promoting sustainable development has ended. Now, 
the debate has shifted to what role the WTO should play in protecting the 
environment and promoting sustainable development. Radical suggestions range 
from supporting the establishment of a new world-wide environmental organization 
to completely changing the nature of the WTO. A simpler way to do this, however, 
is to look at how the current status of the WTO can be improved to more effectively 
support the WTO’s objectives of sustainable development.  
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SECTION V: RECOMMENDATIONS  
While some state sovereignty is clearly surrendered when joining an 
organization like the WTO, it would not be widely accepted to create stringent 
environmental and human rights protections in an institution that was created solely 
to regulate trade. Furthermore, if the WTO were to fail, there would be little to no 
regulation or rules governing international trade and the environment would surely 
suffer. Thus, the WTO must work on more effectively protecting the environment 
and fulfilling its objective to promote sustainable development. There are four main 
ways that it can begin to do this. First, it can define what the WTO can realistically 
accomplish and publically declare this finding. Second, it can work to make the 
DSB more effective. Third, it can learn from the successes and failures of 
multilateral and regional agreements. Finally, it can strengthen its relationships with 
public and private actors.  
V. A. Clarify What the WTO Can Realistically Accomplish 
The WTO cannot solve all of the environmental issues plaguing the world. It 
can, however, take demonstrative steps to fulfil its sustainable development 
objective and promote more trade-related environmental protections. One way the 
WTO can realistically accomplish this is by working to create more comprehensive 
and simply defined laws concerning the environment. Over the past years, the WTO 
system has matured and “some of the environmental omissions in WTO law have 
become more evident.”
250
 For example, the TBT Agreement does not contain any 
environmental exceptions to its requirement that regulations and laws must accord 
national treatment and most-favoured nation treatment.
251
 Also, the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (hereinafter “GATS”) does contain an exception for 
measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”
252
 but does not 
contain any measure relating to policy exceptions for any conservation measures. It 
is here that the WTO could make a significant difference. For example, the member 
states could pass resolutions that clearly define how the objective of sustainable 
development fits within each of the supplemental agreements. To that end, it could 
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begin negotiating for accepted environmental exceptions for each supplemental 
agreement that would eventually become binding by consensus.  
However, while there are ways to improve the supplemental documents for 
future use, they can also be used in their current state to promote the objective of 
sustainable development. For example, the TBT Agreement requires that WTO 
member states must use international standards as the basis for technical regulations 
unless these standards would be “an ineffective or inappropriate means for the 
fulfilment of the legitimate objective pursued...”
253
 The TBT Agreement was a 
major decisive factor in the Sardines case where the Appellate Body held broadly 
that the “voluntary, non-consensus standards”
254
 should qualify as “international 
standards.”
255
 While this decision was not adopted, it did open the door for future 
debates on environmental protections and sustainable development harmonisations. 
This means that if a member state voluntarily complies with an environmental 
technical regulation that has not yet gained recognition as an “international 
standard,” it may still meet the requirements under the TBT Agreement. This also 
means that if there is no agreed upon international standard, the DSB may allow a 
more flexible approach to accepting non-traditional standards. 
The WTO can also more efficiently use the different committees it currently 
has to work more effectively on promoting its sustainable development objective. 
The CTE currently acts as a venue where national officials from trade and 
environment delegations meet, including representatives from the UN 
Environmental Program.
256
 While the value of the past meetings should not be 
discarded as they have shown some progress and a willingness to at least hear what 
some of those in the environmental field have to say, it is important to note that the 
CTE has failed to grant observer status to many international environmental 
organizations.
257
 By doing this, the CTE risks making the leaders of these 
organizations feel dejected and excluded- an action that could have consequences 
such as negative public relations and a lack of respect for the WTO in the 
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international community. By granting observer status to more organizations, the 
CTE would be able to expand on its effectiveness by reaching a wider audience and 
it could gain more comprehensive data for its discussions from information gathered 
by the newly included organizations. Furthermore, this gesture would illustrate the 
WTO’s continued commitment to more effectively protect the environment.  
The WTO Secretariat can also take a more significant role in promoting the 
objective of sustainable development. While some ways to do this are listed above, 
there are still other ways in which it could further encourage this. First, the WTO 
Secretariat can make better use of its Trade Policy Review Reports (hereinafter 
“TPR Reports”). While many of the TPR reports do contain notes on some 
ecological factors, it could more effectively utilize them to contain more sound 
scientific reasoning and encourage more sustainable measures.
258
 As of yet, these 
reports have failed to do this. It is here, that the WTO could more effectively work 
to promote its sustainable development objective. It could use these reports as a way 
to explicitly state environmental steps and goals that are member state specific based 
on the detailed study of regional ecological factors. Second, the WTO Secretariat 
could also promote more friendly relationships with non-state entities, including 
NGOs and private actors. How to accomplish this goal is discussed thoroughly in 
Section V. D. below.  
One major limitation on what the WTO can realistically accomplish is the 
matter of jurisdiction. The WTO does not have the power to regulate member states. 
Rather, it makes decisions on alleged violations between member states concerning 
trade-related environmental measures. It is up to the member states to bring the 
cases before the DSB rather than being the responsibility the WTO to find relevant 
cases.  Thus, the member states themselves are accountable for what measures are 
challenged and what measures are not. Furthermore, the WTO has no jurisdiction 
over private entities and corporations. The WTO is a collective of member states, 
and it is up to the member state to regulate the corporations that reside within its 
borders. For example, if state A believes that a corporation residing in state B is 
operating in violation of state B’s WTO obligations, then it is up to the state A to 
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bring a claim against state B in the DSB. Again, it is not the responsibility of the 
WTO to regulate the individual measures within a member state.  
Finally, while an in-depth analysis of the effectiveness of the DSB is discussed 
in the next section, it is also important to discuss whether or not the DSB is the most 
appropriate forum for all sustainable development claims. Five categories of 
environmental trade issues have been identified, and it would be prudent if claims 
brought to the DSB remained in these categories. The first four were identified by 
Schoenbaum
259
 as trade restrictions in the name of environmental quality, and the 
fifth is a newly identified category to enhance the discussion. These categories are as 
follows: 
1) Regulation of imports and exports to protect the 
domestic environment; 
2) Trade restrictions to enforce environmental 
standards in international agreements; 
3) Trade restrictions in response to perceived 
inadequate environmental protection controls in 
other countries;  
4) Controls on the export of hazardous products, 
technologies and waste;
260
 and  
5) Trade restrictions to protect areas outside the 




The final category applies to areas of the global commons, where regulation has 
previously been hard to negotiate. In the abstract, it could apply to future 
explorations of space. Currently, it would more likely apply to migratory animals 
that move from one jurisdiction to another and transboundary pollution. This final 
area of trade-related environmental claims does relate to the WTO as illustrated by 
the DSB Appellate Body when it declared in the Shrimp Turtle case
262
 that member 
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While the list above is fairly broad and most claims may fit under it, there 
are other reasons that claims may have more appropriate fora than the WTO itself. 
For example, if a participating state of the Antarctic Treaty system
264
 or the 
Antarctic Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (also known 
both as the Antarctic-Environmental Protocol or the Madrid Protocol)
265
 wanted to 
challenge a measure concerning the Antarctic region or simply wanted to enact more 
protection, it would be better for that state to go to the other participating states of 
the treaty. This has been done numerous times concerning the Antarctic regions, 
including the enactments of the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Flora and 
Fauna,
266
 the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals,
267
 and the 
Conservation of Antarctica Marine Living Resources.
268
 These measures show that 
specific environmental protections may be gained in forums other than the WTO and 
that in some cases this may be a preferred method to enact such change.  
 In conclusion, it is not the sole responsibility of the WTO to protect the 
environment and promote sustainable development. However, there are several ways 
in which the WTO can improve upon its current objective. For instance, it can more 
effectively use the CTE and the Secretariat as leaders in promoting sustainable 
development as it relates to trade. It can also make better use of the supplemental 
documents to the GATT, and it can look to the future by beginning negotiations on 
binding resolutions to more clearly tie the environment to the supplemental 
documents.  Finally, while a general consensus already exists that not all 
environmental claims should be brought before the WTO and the DSB, other bodies 
such as regional arrangements and the UN should be better utilized if they are 
deemed a more appropriate venue for a specific environmental debate.  
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V. B. Make the WTO’s dispute resolution system and the DSB more effective 
The DSB has been able to advance the WTO’s sustainable development 
objective by ruling on environmental measures. As discussed in Section III of this 
paper, case precedent on environmental claims is slowly growing and possibilities 
exist to use other subparagraphs of Article XX to bring claims under. There is great 
potential to integrate more sustainable development discussions in the DSB and the 
WTO’s dispute resolution system as a whole. However, the DSB has faced many 
claims of bias and unfairness, generally based on the facts that only a handful of the 
member states actually use the DSB and that developing nations are hesitant to use 
it. Thus, this section focuses on how to improve the DSB generally. It is the belief of 
this author that making the DSB more effective in any means will in time contribute 
to the sustainable development objective by making the DSB a more useful and 
valuable tool to promote and protect trade-related environmental regulations.  
While any member state can bring a claim to the DSB, most have not, 
especially those in developing nations. In contrast, almost ten years after the WTO 
was established, the European Union (hereinafter “EU”) and the United States were 
plaintiffs or defendants in 210 out of the 279 complaints brought before the WTO, 
consisting of more than 75% of the total claims.
269
 While it is true that the United 
States and EU account for a large majority of the world’s trade, the DSB could be 
seen as only catering to them and developed nations, rather than as a judicial body 
supposed to represent all member states. Furthermore, there is a difference in how 
developed and developing nations use the DSB. For example, a study conducted in 
2003 showed that defendants in WTO claims were more likely to offer greater 
concessions in the consultation stage or during the Panel stage if it was before a 
ruling.
270
 However, this trend was less evident in cases involving developing 
nations.
271
 This information would be extremely beneficial to a developing nation 
that was hoping to have a greater concession offered to it in the consultation stage, 
as it appears that it may be more worthwhile for it to seek an actual Panel ruling.  
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To combat these issues, the WTO should first encourage more participation 
in the DSB process by states that do not generally take part in the proceedings. 
There may be many reasons why many member states do not participate, including 
lack a lack of monetary, technological and information resources, and a distrust of 
and lack of belief in the effectiveness of the DSB system.
272
 The WTO has taken 
steps to combat these issues like: granting special and differential treatment to 
LDCs; good offices, conciliation and mediation offered to LDCs; additional legal 
services offered to developing nations; legal training courses in Geneva; and legal 
aid services from the WTO’s Advisory Centre that specializes in WTO law.
273
 
While these efforts are extraordinary, they still mean little to LDCs that are unable 
to pay for travel to and from Geneva or to developing countries that lack faith in the 
DSB system. It is here that a public campaign by the WTO should be conducted to 
encourage more participation by these countries.  
Second, the WTO could attempt to bridge the gap on the differences between 
how developed and developing nations use the DSB. As mentioned above, it appears 
that the developing nations that are actually using the DSB do not do as well as 
developed nations in the consultation stage before a Panel ruling.
274
 Reasons for this 
range from a lack of WTO law expertise and accesses to monetary resources to not 
being respected by the developed nations as important to the trading system.
275
 The 
first of these reasons is already being dealt with by the WTO in the form of offering 
free legal aid. This could be advanced by offering more specialized legal training in 
WTO law in more numerous sites around the world. There is no simple solution, 
however, for the second issue as it is not easy to make one side respect the other 
more. Probably the only practical solution would be to work on giving developing 
nations and LDCs more of a voice and then hoping that respect for the power that 
they can wield would grow from developed nations.  
Despite all of the criticisms concerning the effectiveness of the DSB, it is 
undeniable that much of the WTO’s progress concerning the protection of the 
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environment has come from its decisions. The DSB has a strong and well-known 
compliance record, meaning that once it has made a decision on a case, member 
states generally follow it.
276
 In the first ten years of its existence, 83% of the DSB’s 
judgments were complied with.
277
 However, this statistic strictly refers to 
compliance as “how a WTO decision was implemented and whether the offending 
measure was withdrawn.”
278
 If an offending measure was only modified or replaced, 
more problems with compliance may have occurred, but this information was not 
collected in the statistical findings. In fact, other studies show that the compliance 
rate has started to decline in effectiveness in recent years.
279
  
Thus, the high compliance rate that is touted by WTO supporters may not 
include the whole picture. There are several ways to remedy this. First, it would be 
helpful to know the actual compliance statistics if all the results were factored in. 
This would show where the weaknesses of compliance are. However, these statistics 
would be hard to calculate, and there may not be enough cases to make this study 
relevant yet, as the DSB has not been in existence for a long enough period. While 
there have been some attempts to mathematically calculate the actual statistics of 
compliance,
280
 even the authors of these studies admit that the actual statistics are 
hard to clarify as there are so many utside factors.
281
 Another suggestion would be 
to have member states publicall  praise or chastise those who have or have not 
complied with previous decisions. This would be especially beneficial if a state that 
brought the action to the DSB publically praised the member state that it brought the 
action against after that state had remedied the offending measure.  
The DSB has also made significant decisions concerning the WTO’s 
objective to promote sustainable development. For example, in the Shrimp Turtle 
case, the Appellate Body declared that the preamble of the Marrakesh agreement 
clearly shows that the WTO negotiators “decided to qualify the original objectives 
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of the GATT 1947’, and demonstrates a recognition by the WTO negotiators that 
optimal use of the world’s resources should be made in accordance with the 
objectives of sustainable development.”
282
 Furthermore, the compliance panel 
affirmed this sentiment in 2001 when it stated, “sustainable development is one of 
the main objectives if the WTO Agreement.”
283
 Thus, the DSB clearly factors in this 
objective into its decisions. One major way that it could take further action towards 
this end would be to require the input of environmental experts on its trade-related 
environmental cases. Currently, the DSU Agreement does not have a requirement 
for expertise in environmental disputes.
284
 If the WTO members were to amend this 
and require that some environmental experts be consulted during these cases, it 
would ensure that the Panel has a more standardized basis for its decisions, and 
positive public opinion and recognition concerning the decisions may be more 
widely recognized.  
Finally, it is important to note that very few cases concerning the 
environment have been brought to the DSB. Of the few cases heard by the DSB, the 
earliest ones debated over whether the WTO wanted to protect the “sustainability” 
aspects, like environmental issues, or if it was going to more focus on the 
“development” aspect.
285
 While this issue has yet to be fully resolved, the DSB is 
clearly evolving into a more environmentally friendly body, as its decisions have 
“inspired confidence in the adjudication process, and convinced many 
environmentalists that legitimate environmental measures would be permitted in the 
WTO.”
286
 However, in the first three environmental cases it heard, the Appellate 
Body had to reverse some part of the Panel’s central holding because of a flaw in 
reasoning and the interpretation of the exceptions in Article XX of the GATT. Thus, 
it is clear that the Panel and the Appellate Body do not always have the same 
opinions concerning environmental measures and the exceptions under Article XX. 
There are two ways to alleviate this problem. The main way to combat this problem 
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is to give the DSB time to develop case precedent. Member states could help by 
bringing more relevant trade-related environmental claims.   
 In conclusion, the WTO’s dispute resolution system and DSB have a 
moderately high compliance record. There is some debate as to whether or not this 
record is well-deserved or if it is in decline, as the statistics on actual compliance is 
hard to calculate. Furthermore, developing nations and LDCs have been hesitant to 
use the system and should be encouraged to participate more. This can be done by 
offering more support through resources and training and attempting to change the 
public opinion of the DSB in those countries. Furthermore, the DSB could continue 
to support the sustainable development objective by requiring trade-related Panel 
decisions to at least consult the opinion of environmental experts. Finally, the WTO 
members could be encouraged to bring more measures before the DSB to create a 
wider body of case precedent. By making the DSB more effective, it follows that 
environmental claims brought before the court will receive the benefits of greater 
efficiency. This, in turn, will promote the WTO’s objective of sustainable 
development.  
V. C. Emulate Successes and Learn from Failures of Multilateral, Regional and 
Preferential Trade Agreements 
While widespread, comprehensive world-wide agreement on environmental 
rights and sustainable development has been elusive, there has been more success in 
multilateral and regional agreements. The agreements are numerous and are specific 
to a region or a particular environmental concern. They include stand alone 
multilateral agreement systems such as the Ozone Regime and as parts of other 
regional agreements such as the EU. Furthermore, the WTO sometimes finds itself 
in competition with preferential trade agreements (hereinafter “PTAs”), which are 
agreements between two or more member states that cover “trade and” issues that 
expand beyond the scope of the WTO.
287
 These agreements have proven to be more 
inclusive, comprehensive and successful than any attempts made by the WTO.
288
 
Examples of all three of these, and what the WTO can learn from studying them, are 
found below. 
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One multilateral environmental protection agreement that the WTO could 
learn from is the Ozone regime. This regime emerged in the late 1980s and consists 
of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (hereinafter “Ozone 
Convention”)
289
 and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer (hereinafter “Montreal Protocol”).
290
 This regime has been successful in 
phasing out the production and consumption of harmful chemicals, including 
chlorofluorocarbons (hereinafter “CFCs”), that “migrate into the stratosphere and 
destroy ozone molecules in the upper atmosphere.”
291
 CFCs, popularly used in 
aerosol cans and sprays, were created in 1928, and at the time were hailed as 
technological triumphs.
292
 However, as time went on, the scientific community 
began to recognize that these chemicals were actually harmful to the environment 
and were degrading the ozone layer that is vital to human survival, as it shields the 
Earth’s atmosphere from ultraviolet radiation.
293
   
Before the passage of the Ozone regime, some states like the United 
States,
294
 Canada, and Sweden
295
 unilaterally banned aerosol use, but these acts lead 
to the fear that other states would be pressured into passing likewise regulations in 
order to keep positive trade relationships with those countries.
296
 Furthermore, a 
debate arose over the validity of the scientific research, mostly concerning whether 
or not the CFCs were actually to blame for the ozone depletion.
297
 This debate led to 
the eventual passage of the Ozone Convention. However, neither side was 
particularly satisfied with this result, and thus the subsequent Montreal Protocol was 
passed. Even though there was some debate, the successes of the Ozone regime can 
be seen by looking at the fact that due to its existence, the demand for the chemical 
has significantly dropped, and as such, so has the production, usage and 
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consumption of CFCs. It is also important to note that with the decrease in the use of 
CFCs, there has also been a decrease in the degradation of the ozone.
298
 This author 
concedes that correlation does not always equal causation, but the results could 
signify that CFCs were damaging the environment, and now they are no longer 
doing so to the extent that they were previously. More important to note as a 
success, though, is the fact that the international community was able to shift the 
demand for a product due to environmental concerns. Thus, WTO members could 
use this same tactic to slowly change the demand for a product that they found 
environmentally damaging. 
 The EU claims to have some of the world’s highest environmental standards 
with its main current priorities focused on protecting endangered species, protecting 
habitats, and finding ways to use natural resources more efficiently.
299
 The history of 
the EU’s environmental policy spans multiple agreements,
300
 but it was not until the 
Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam in 1992 and 1997 that sustainable 
development was explicitly declared as an EU goal. Today, the EU is seen as having 
a strict sustainable development policy that is enacted alongside its promotion of 
economic growth.
301
 There are claims that the EU’s commitments are merely 
symbolic in nature and that there is no way to bring the two worlds of sustainable 
development and economic growth together.
302
 However, it is possible that this 
symbolism is an actual reflection of a new precedent in the global economy to 
include environmental protections in the debate at the beginning of the negotiations. 
If this is the case, then the EU’s regulations would be a sign of what is to come and 
what is possible, rather than what can never be. 
 An example of actual action that the EU has taken to promote its sustainable 
development goal was the major leadership role it played at the World Summit on 
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Sustainable Development (hereinafter “WSSD”) in 2002 in Johannesburg, South 
Africa.
303
 This action came after the EU was also seen as a main protagonist for the 
environment and sustainable development during the negotiations for the Kyoto 
Protocol on Climate change in 1997.
304
 Thus, while the EU is still struggling to 
integrate its own regulations, it has become one of the foremost global leaders on 
promoting sustainable development by championing the cause and advancing its 
agenda world-wide. This would suggest that the strict regulations that it hopes to 
impose are less of a symbolic declaration than it is a work in progress that requires 
world-wide recognition and support. It also illustrates that ambitious sustainable 
development action will not be done quickly and should be given time to progress. 
This lesson also applies to the WTO. The criticisms discussed in this paper mostly 
focus on how the WTO is merely declaring its commitment, rather than promoting 
actual action.  However, the Marrakesh agreement was written less than twenty 
years ago and it is reasonably possible that not enough time has passed to see actual, 
lasting change.   
 Most PTAs contain some sort of provision concerning the environment. For 
example, all PTAs negotiated by the United States contain a chapter on the 
environment “that commits parties t  enforce their own environmental laws and 
provides for dispute settlement should that not occur.”
305
 Most of the United States’ 
PTAs also contain side agreements that that strengthen capacity building and 
environmental cooperation.
306
 The United States clearly sets a high environmental 
standard that other states must meet if they want to enter into a PTA with them. Not 
surprisingly, this type of agreement has garnered the most criticism from the WTO. 
This criticism was most notable in the 2005 Report of the Consultative Board to the 
WTO Director-General, also known as the Sutherland Commission, which criticized 
infusing non-trade objectives like the environment into PTAs.
307
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It is understandable that the WTO would criticize other multilateral and 
regional agreements, as well as PTAs. It is true that the reason many of these 
agreements work is because the small number of participating states makes them 
easier to manage, and lessons learned on this small scale may not work on a global 
scale. It is also true some of these agreements over-reach and undermine the 
authority of the WTO. Regardless, there are still things to be learned from their 
successes. The Ozone regime shows that a large collective of states can, over time, 
change public opinions and demand to be more environmentally friendly. The EU’s 
strict environmental policy shows that even if a collective of states is still working 
on defining and standardizing its own environmental policies, it can still be a leader 
on other sustainable development agendas. It also shows that comprehensive 
agendas will take time to implement, even on a regional level. Furthermore, the EU 
has been able to remain effective while promoting the dual agenda of economic 
growth and sustainable development. Finally, PTAs, while controversial, are taking 
immediate steps to foster actions from states to actually protect their environments 
and promote sustainable development.  
Multilateral and regional agreements foster and enhance cooperation, 
facilitate learning, bestow authority and define roles.
308
 They also allow for the 
retention of some sovereignty b  acting as agents for internal realignments but do 
not force states to give up rights if they do not want to sign certain provisions. Some 
agreements even allow for states to make reservations and all allow for participating 
members to be part of the negotiation process. Finally, these agreements go further 
than simply declaring that something must be done, they actually demand action. 
While it is true that none of this is applicable if the states do not agree in the first 
place, especially when each has a different interest at stake, it would be a lost 
opportunity if one were to simply ignore the noteworthy successes of some 
multilateral and regional agreements and dismiss them as irrelevant in the trade-
related environmental debate.  
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V. D. Utilize Outside Actor Assistance 
The WTO could utilize outside actor assistance to make a significant 
contribution to sustainable development and environmental protection. It could do 
this by re-examining its relationship with both NGOs and private organizations. 
While it may be true that some NGOs are also private organizations, for the 
purposes of this paper the “private” designation attaches to companies with a for-
profit motive. Concerning NGOs, the WTO could work to build a relationship that 
differs from the current strained, sometimes hostile one it has with most NGOs. This 
new partnership could bring about some changes such as more access to the WTO 
process granted to NGOs, better monitoring and expert advice communicated to the 
WTO, and the possible promotion of fair trade products and practices. Concerning 
private organizations, there are numerous ways that the WTO could prosper, 
including promoting further consultations and Corporate Social Responsibility 
(hereinafter “CSR”) agendas and allowing for some co-regulation and self-
regulation.  
V. D. i. NGOs 
There is a long-standing relationship between the WTO and NGOs, as NGOs 
are specifically mentioned in the Marrakesh agreement in Article V:2,
309
 and their 
relationship was discussed in detail in the guidelines adopted by the WTO General 
Council in 1996 that “recognized the role NGOs can play to increase the awareness 
of the public in respect of WTO activities.”
310
 However, positive interaction 
between the two has remained minimal and has sometimes become aggressive and 
hostile. Both sides claim that the other does not play fairly, distorts information, and 
only pursues its own agendas.
311
 For example, in 2001 at the Ministerial Conference 
some NGOs like Public Citizen and Global Trade Watch were instrumental in 
planning and supporting large-scale protests that brought the WTO to public 
attention.
312
 This mobilization of certain NGOs painted the WTO in a negative 
                                                 
309
 Supra, n. 17 at Art. V:2.  
310
 World Trade Organization, Guidelines for arrangements on relations with non-governmental 
organizations (23 July 1996) WT/L/162 WTO. 
311
 Supra, n. 48 at 20.  
312


















 and is probably one of the main reasons that the WTO has more recently 
sought to improve its relationship with NGOs.  
Many economists agree that some regulatory structures are needed to prevent 
externalities and market failures in economic systems.
314
 Without regulations on 
things like pollution and over-fishing, trade could easily result in over-exploitation 
of resources and increased environmental degradation.
315
 Thus, some form of 
structure is needed, and currently one of the only viable options for that structure is 
the WTO. After the 1996 guidelines, NGO interaction with the WTO has mostly 
been centred on attendance at Ministerial Conferences, consultative relationships 
with member states governments, and participation in issue specific symposia. 
NGOs and other outside actors have also been granted the right to submit amicus 
curie briefs to the DSB.
316
 Furthermore, the WTO Secretariat sponsors annual public 
forums where members of civic society and the private sector meet and interact with 
WTO officials.
317
 While environmental concerns have been a major focus of these 
meetings, the results have not always been positive as it was noted in 2002 that “the 
WTO continues to resist making arrangements, consistent with those in other major 
international organizations, for consultation and cooperation with NGOs.”
318
 
NGOs can also submit position papers which are eventually circulated to the 
member states.
319
 This does not, however, mean that these papers are actually read 
or taken seriously. Even if an NGO submits a paper, there is no guarantee that it will 
be circulated as the WTO Secretariat can decide for any reason not to include it. Due 
to this, NGOs have been hesitant to submit large numbers of position papers.
320
 
Furthermore, it has been reported by some NGOs that their access to the WTO 
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process has been restricted and that their opinions are not respected when they do 
attend the plenary meetings or participate in the issue specific symposia.
321
 
Within the WTO itself, many of the officials that operate within the 
international trading system believe that greater NGO participation would actually 
harm the international trading system.
322
 Some of the reasons cited for this include 
that the WTO is not meant to regulate the environment and that NGOs are not 
member states. However, a more open WTO that grants increased access to NGOs 
would more than likely help, rather than hinder, the process of advancing the 
sustainable development goal.
323
 NGOs can provide a wealth of knowledge and act 
as monitors in situations where the WTO lacks the resources itself.
324
 NGOs can 
also assist with giving WTO member states that have traditionally lacked the 
resources to be heard in negotiations, or even attend the rounds, a stronger and 
louder voice.  
Concerning the environment, NGOs have traditionally stepped in to be both 
the advocate for increased regulations and to monitor the efficiency of the current 
ones. They have done this by lobbying the WTO, or publically chastising it, for 
change. It appears that the WTO can do little to avoid playing some role as a 
regulatory agency,
325
 and it must find ways to be inclusive of NGO assistance and 
input. In the future, WTO members could publically support more NGO 
involvement including actively seeking consultations and position papers with 
environmental groups, promoting more interaction of NGOs at meetings and 
generally worki g on making the relationship between the two less hostile. In return, 
NGOs and the “green movement” could agree to work more with the WTO on what 
it can realistically do to promote sustainable development and to stop chastising it 
for aspects that it has no control over.  
A final way that these two bodies could work together would be to focus 
more on the demand aspect of trade. This means that NGOs could further use their 
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authority and influence, endorsed by the WTO Secretariat, member states and the 
CTE, to create public marketing campaigns to promote environmentally friendly 
products and procedures. By working together to create a more sustainable 
development minded public opinion, industries and trade would hopefully shift to be 
more environmentally aware. This suggestion of course will neither solve all 
environmental issues, nor will it create a world where sustainable development 
reigns supreme, especially after it has been shown that marketing schemes for “fair 
trade” products have only proven to be a niche market.
326
 However, it is precisely 
the point that every step, even small ones on a global scale, could make a difference. 
Thus, a step of a publically declared partnership between NGOs and the WTO to 
promote fair trade products could go a long way in setting future precedent. 
In summary, the WTO has a long-standing temperamental relationship with 
NGOs. This does hinders the effectiveness of the WTO’s authority and quite often 
creates bad public opinion. On the other side, NGOs are increasingly finding 
themselves more dependent on the decisions made by the WTO to promulgate 
change. Thus, the two seemingly different interests actually rely on each other and 
should seek better ways to work together. A major step would be to actively work on 
making NGOs more respected in the decision making process by having them 
participate more as consultants, write more position papers and attend more 
meetings. WTO members should also actively work on seriously considering what 
NGOs are saying, as it is unlikely that they are going to go away anytime soon. 
Furthermore, WTO member states should be encouraged to form partnerships with 
NGOs to promote fair trade initiatives. By starting to implement the above steps, the 
relationship between the two will be strengthened. Neither side should be quick to 
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V. D. ii. Private Partnerships  
The WTO could also work on its relationship with private companies and 
organizations concerning the environment and sustainable development. The 
reaction from private parties around the world concerning the jurisdictional powers 
of the WTO has been mixed.
327
 Some private firms see the WTO as an interfering 
body that constricts and unfairly regulates them.
328
 Others see this relationship as an 
opportunity to influence government and have more of a voice in the public arena.
329
 
There are several ways in which the private-public relationship could be enhanced, 
including promoting better communication and consultation, private firm self-
regulation and CSR agendas. 
Before looking at what the WTO can do to promote public-private 
relationships, the ongoing issues that have previously plagued this field of thought 
should first be analyzed. Mainly, there has been an increased blurring of the line 
between the private and public spheres when it comes to the WTO. This growing 
trend is extremely apparent in the fact that some governments, most notably in the 
United States and Europe, are more often seeking the opinions of private enterprises 
and their lawyers and are using private litigation strategies in the global sphere.
330
 
The history between private companies and governments pre-dates the WTO. 
Private firms have often collaborated with their jurisdictional governments to work 
to reduce foreign trade barriers, described as “any measure that directly or indirectly 
results in an impediment to trade.”
331
 Thus, many international disputes, including 
those concerning trade, the environment and sustainable development, are not 
strictly public or intergovernmental.  
The easiest and most commonly agreed upon way to create a public-private 
partnership is to support and promote consultations and cooperation between private 
actors and the WTO.
332
 As mentioned above, there has been a long history of 
governments seeking the advice and resources of private actors. While the lines 
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between the private and the public arenas have sometimes become blurred, the 
effects are not always negative. For example, if WTO members were seeking to 
work on reducing depleting fish stocks due to overfishing by further regulating trade 
standards, they could consult more with private businesses and firms that have a 
wealth of information on the subject. While NGOs may only converse about the 
evils of any fishing, businesses would have the know-how to discuss the realities of 
the problem. In today’s market, there is no way to completely prohibit all fishing in 
all forms to protect certain fish stock. This was attempted by the US on several 
occasions, but the DSB rejected its efforts to ban some forms of fishing as veiled 
forms of trade favouritism.
333
 However, businesses would be able to give a practical 
view as to what kind of reduction could be made and what kind of future goals could 
be realistically met.  
Some private organizations have adopted international self-regulation to 
avoid further legislation from the WTO. For example, the WTO made a decision to 
create a code of ethical and scientific standards concerning the sale and marketing of 
pharmaceuticals, but before it could enact this the International Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association voluntarily adopted their own Code of 
Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices and avoided further regulations on their 
marketing practices.
334
 Thus, the fear of action from the WTO in the form of 
regulations that private firms’ jurisdictional governments have to comply with, 
private companies will be more inspired to self-regulate. While in theory this is a 
good thing, the WTO should work more with private firms in developing regulations 
that comply with WTO standards and should assist with the monitoring of the 
compliance of the new rules.  
A final way that the WTO could strengthen its relationship with private 
actors would be to actively support and implement CSR campaigns. While the 
concept of CSR has changed of the years and currently has a broad meaning,
335
 a 
simple definition would be: “a company’s sense of responsibility towards the 
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 Thus, the WTO could work to make private 
sectors have more of a responsibility towards the environment. This could be done 
through CSR initiatives in the CTE and the WTO Secretariat. Furthermore, WTO 
member states could individually take the initiative by creating regional CSR 
schemes that encourage greater environmental responsibility and promote 
sustainable development. 
In summary, there are many ways in which the private-public relationship 
could be enhanced between the WTO and private firms. Some ways that this can be 
done include: promoting better communication and consultation between the two 
spheres, supporting internal self-regulation in private firms and implementing CSR 
campaigns. There are major hurdles to overcome in creating a harmonizing, efficient 
relationship between these two arenas, but the positive effects of such a coordinating 
effort would far outweigh the negative. Concerning sustainable development and 
environmental rights, the WTO could also begin to make the environment a larger 
part of their discussion when strengthening its relationship with private firms, and it 
could make more of an effort to build relationships with private environmental 
entities.  
V. D. iii. Strengthen the Relationship between the WTO and the UN 
The WTO should look to strengthen its relationship with the UN and work 
more from within that institution. As discussed above in Section II, the UN and 
WTO have a long-standing relationship when it comes to environmental protection 
and sustainable development. However, this relationship has been criticized as 
mostly being symbolic, rather than actually inspiring action. By strengthening its 
relationship with the UN to better protect the environment, the WTO would alleviate 
some of the pressure to provide these protections on its own. There are signs that 
indicate that this is already taking place; for instance, the proposal and participation 
of the WTO with the Rio +20 Conference could provide a perfect opportunity for the 
WTO to reintroduce itself as a leader in the field of promoting sustainable 
development ideals. Furthermore, the WTO’s role in promoting the UN’s 
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Millennium Development Goals (hereinafter “MDGs”)
337
 should be reinforced and 
fostered.  
The UN Conference on Sustainable Development is hosting a RIO +20 
Conference in Brazil from 4 to 6 June in 2012. The objective of the Conference is 
to: “secure renewed political commitment for sustainable development, access the 
progress to date and the remaining gaps in the implementation of the outcomes of 
the major summits on sustainable development, and address new and emerging 
challenges.”
338
 The Conference has two themes: “a green economy in the context of 
sustainable development and poverty eradication; and the institutional framework 
for sustainable development.”
339
 The WTO has submitted a proposal for the 
conference and plans on attending and participating; however, much of the text is 
simply to reaffirm its earlier declarations on its commitment to sustainable 
development.
340
 Regardless, taking part in this conference is a good opportunity for 
the WTO to reframe its relationship with the UN and sustainable development. It 
would be helpful though if the WTO would not only declare its commitments but 
would also become more of a leader in the sustainable development realm by 
working to strengthen its relationship with the UN. It could do this by having the 
CTE and the WTO Secretariat draft non-binding plans of action to promote more 
effective environmental protection. The WTO could also ask its member states to 
publically support the environmental and sustainable development goals of the UN 
if they are not already doing so. 
Another way the WTO can strengthen its relationship with the UN is to work 
with it on achieving the MDGs. While all members of the WTO are members of the 
UN, the relationship between the two bodies could be strengthened by advocating 
the others’ agendas concerning sustainable development. For example, there are a 
few of the MGDs that can apply directly to the WTO. The MDGs are a set of eight 
international development goals all UN member states and a large number of 
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international organizations have signed. The MDGs seek to achieve an end to 
poverty, or at least have the outlined goals reached, by 2015. There are different 
achievements and goals for developed countries, developing countries and LDCs, 
but the main themes of reducing child mortality rates, reducing extreme poverty, 
fighting epidemics like HIV/AIDS, and creating a global development partnership 
remain the same.
341
 It is here, particularly with MDG 8 to build a global partnership 
for development,
342
 where the WTO could make an impact or at least become an 
adamant supporter of this new global partnership. 
In conclusion, while the WTO and UN already have a strong relationship 
concerning environmental protection and sustainable development, there is always 
room for growth. By actively participating in the Rio + 20 Conference and by 
adamantly supporting the achievement of the MDGs, the WTO will strengthen its 
relationship with the UN, and it will be taking a step towards attaining its objective 
of sustainable development. Also, by taking these steps the WTO will probably help 
to build positive public opinion which may be needed after the conclusion of the 
Doha Round. 
SECTION VI: CONCLUSION 
Since the 1980s, the value of world trade has more than quadrupled, 
facilitated by a large amount of global, regional and bilateral trade agreements.
343
 At 
the same time, there has been an increased global interest in environmental 
protections and sustainable development. Thus, the two distinct fields of trade and 
the environment have been developing on parallel planes. There have been many 
attempts to bring these two fields together; however, as of yet, none of these 
attempts have created an effective regime. The WTO has taken several initiatives to 
begin working on some sort of understanding concerning the environment and 
working towards a more sustainable future. However, the majority of these 
initiatives are only declaratory in nature and have failed to achieve actual action. 
The one main success of the WTO is the DSB which has been able to make binding 
                                                 
341
 See generally, Nana K Poku and Jim Whitman, The Millennium Development Goals and 
Development after 2015, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2011), 181-198.  
342
 Supra, n. 336 at 8.  
343
 K Gallagher, Mexico and the Trade Environment Debates, Free Trade and the Environment, 
















rulings on environmental protections. While not all of the adopted Panel decisions 
were pro-environment, they did open the door to bring future trade-related 
environmental cases which could set the precedent for actual change.  
Before progress can be made the current debates concerning the relationship 
between trade and the environment must be discussed. This arena has been 
dominated by environmentalists vs. free trade advocates and developed nations vs. 
developing nations and LDCs. Most of these discussions deal with power struggles, 
lack of resources and the belief that there is no place for environmental protections 
or the promotion of sustainable development in the WTO. While it is likely that the 
first two of these debates will continue into the future, it is time to admit that the last 
of these arguments is now outdated. The environment clearly matters and should be 
incorporated into the WTO system. Now, the question becomes: how can the WTO 
work to more effectively protect the environment and promote sustainable 
development? 
There are many ways that the WTO can begin to work towards this objective 
and this paper has discussed four of them. First, what the WTO can realistically 
accomplish and what it will never be able to achieve must be more clearly defined. 
Second, the WTO’s dispute resolution system and the DSB need to be made more 
effective and inclusive of all member states. Third, the WTO should emulate the 
successes and learn from the failures of multilateral, regional and preferential trade 
agreements. Finally, the WTO should utilize outside assistance and strengthen its 
relationships with NGOs, private institutions and the UN. 
What is clear is that using the WTO to more effectively protect the 
environment is not a short-term goal. Trade is global, and any kind of change or 
support for sustainable development is likely to take time. Therefore, advocates for 
creating a bridge between the worlds of international trade law and sustainable 
development should think in long-term rather than quick-fix mentalities. Just as 
environmentalists have to realize that the WTO is probably going to be a lasting 
international organization that holds great influence over the trade and 
environmental realms, so too must the free trade advocates and the WTO realize that 
environmental protections and the push for sustainable development is not going to 
















itself, rather, it is a means to an end. The end is environmentally sustainable 
economic development.”
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 It is here that the WTO and its member states can make 
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